UC San Diego

Philosophers have developed rich frameworks with which to analyze the normativity of various objectionable forms of non-rational influence, such as manipulation. However, rational influence is seen as the paradigm of permissible influence, and as such, its normative contours have been underexplored. Tracking idiomatic expressions and aphorisms that often emerge in interpersonal interactions, like “Mind your own business,” and “Pick your battles” I address four themes central to evaluating the (im)permissibility of rational influence. In chapter 1, I argue that key features of close personal relationships, namely vulnerability, care, and trust, complicate the normative status of efforts to rationally influence others. I suggest that there are cases in which these features can make it inappropriate or disrespectful to influence another by providing them with even good reasons. In chapter 2, I explore the claim that we need standing (some sort of status or authority) to offer certain sorts of reasons to others, as when we give advice. It is widely held, for instance, that it is inappropriate to offer reasons to others when the underlying matter is not our business. I argue that whether something is our business turns partly on whether we stand in a relationship to the influencee that licenses expectations that they respond to the kind of reason we address to them, be it a request, a demand, advice, etc. In chapter 3, I argue that certain features of special relationships, like expectations of mutual care and trust, can make otherwise generally objectionable forms of nonrational influence, like minor manipulations, permissible. When used appropriately, these forms of influence can even be beneficial to the relationship and its members. Finally, in chapter 4, I turn to trust, which is often construed both as a form of influence and a necessary condition for successful influence. I offer a novel account of unwelcome trust and argue that this phenomenon reveals what we (normatively) expect from others when we trust them. Namely, we expect those we trust to adopt a certain orientation of care toward us, and this is sometimes construed as burdensome or unwelcome because of its connection to special interpersonal relationships.