UCLA

This dissertation defends a moral solution, specifically a solution about fairness, to a puzzle regarding the use of statistical evidence in legal proceedings.To illustrate the puzzle, consider a popular toy case: the mere fact that the majority of attendees in the stadium gatecrashed does not, by itself, seem sufficient to find any one attendee liable. This seems so even if the statistic raises the probability of the disputed fact to a level seemingly high enough to meet the burden of proof (i.e. more likely than not). It is said that all there is, in this case, is “bare” statistical evidence (BSE), and we need "individualized" evidence (IE) for the defendant’s liability. But what differentiates IE from BSE which makes the former but not the latter appropriate for findings of liability (or guilt)?Numerous attempts are made to answer this puzzle. This dissertation critically discusses some influential proposals alongside more recent proposals.One influential proposal makes use of the notion of causation arguing that whereas the factfinder believes IE has a causal connection to the purported fact (of the defendant’s guilt or liability), the factfinder does not believe BSE bears this causal connection.Another influential proposal makes use of the notion of Truth-Sensitivity from the philosophical literature on knowledge arguing that while BSE fails to produce verdicts which are Truth-Sensitive, IE successfully produces Truth-Sensitive verdicts such that: had the defendant not been the perpetrator, the factfinder would not have found them guilty or liable.These proposals are intuitively appealing. However, they are mercilessly objected to. Recent scholarship attempts to refine earlier proposals, clarifying causation and Truth-Sensitivity. However, they still face problems. The primary problem is that the notions of causation and Truth-Sensitivity still lack clarity.In response to the problems, I propose a diagnosis which makes use of fairness: finding on the basis of BSE is unfair because if we made a policy of it, there would be unjust outcomes—innocent people being arbitrarily punished. Whereas a policy of finding on IE does not guarantee unjust outcomes.