UC Berkeley

This dissertation examines the Iran-Contra affair, a major scandal during Ronald Reagan’s presidency that resulted from National Security Council Staffer Oliver North’s scheme to convert profits from secret arms-for-hostages deals with Iran into aid for the Nicaraguan Contras to support their war against the Sandinista government. Popular and scholarly literature offer dramatic narratives of the events and personalities but neglect to assess the transformative effects of Iran-Contra on American foreign policy and political institutions. This dissertation, in contrast, argues that Iran-Contra became the defining post-Vietnam War clash over presidential power: the affair ended the vigorous reassertion of congressional power that the Vietnam War and Watergate inspired, propelling a surprising—and rapid—reanimation of the so-called “Imperial Presidency.” Deriving political security from his public mea culpa and a congressional aversion to impeachment, this dissertation contends, Reagan rescued his presidency and, in the process, restored the president as the arbiter of foreign policy, a consequence of the bipartisan consensus on a strong presidency serving as the foundation for American national security.

Drawing on the most comprehensive set of Iran-Contra related documents to date, this dissertation seeks to explain how, why, and with what consequences Reagan executed a remarkable political recovery and resurrected presidential power from a scandal that threatened, for a time, to compound the presidency’s post-Watergate diminution. It focuses on the interplay of domestic politics and foreign policy that produced the scandal and shows how the resulting crisis of the presidency transformed American governance.

This dissertation analyzes Iran-Contra in four parts. Part I traces the origin of Iran-Contra in three chapters on its domestic and geopolitical contexts. Part II follows the initial two months of Iran-Contra’s public revelation, concluding with the discovery of the diversion memorandum. It presents for the first time a careful reconstruction of Reagan’s decision-making during this pivotal period when Iran-Contra evolved into a crisis. Part III examines Reagan’s recovery from Iran-Contra in two chapters, from disclosing the diversion to issuing a public apology. It details why institutional and personal factors endowed Reagan with political security against the scandal and enabled the restoration of his presidency. Part IV follows Iran-Contra’s resolution in two chapters on the official investigations. It explores inquiries by Congress and the independent counsel, as well as the congressional probes into the October Surprise conspiracy theory.