Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences

Although formal work on war generally sees war as a kind of bargaining breakdown resulting from asymmetric information, bargaining indivisibilities, or commitment problems, most analyses have focused on informational issues. But informational explanations and the models underlying them have at least two major limitations: They often provide a poor account of prolonged conflict as well as odd readings of the history of some cases. This paper describes these limitations and argues that bargaining indivisibilities should really be seen as commitment problems. The present analysis also shows that a common mechanism links three important kinds of commitment problem, i.e., in preventive war, preemptive attacks arising from first-strike or offensive advantages, and in conflicts resulting from bargaining over issues that affect future bargaining power. In each case, large, rapid shifts in the distribution of power can lead to war. Finally, the analysis elaborates a distinctly different mechanism based on a comparison of the cost of deterring an attack with the expected cost of trying to eliminate the threat.