UC Berkeley

My dissertation explains the variation in the types of support that third-party governments and foreign militants provide each other. While certain government-foreign militant partners exchange intelligence, logistical support, and weapons, others engage in much more intense types of cooperation like forming joint commands and carrying out joint attacks. I argue that, when state armed forces and foreign militant groups have similar standard operating procedures (SOPs) and chains of command, they provide each other more intense forms of support, like forming joint commands, carrying out joint attacks, and providing anti-tank missiles. SOPs and chains of command constrain members’ actions, stabilizing an organization’s behavior. Partners similar on these characteristics mutually understand and believe they can predict how the other will react to unexpected events, bolstering their trust that the other will adhere to agreed-upon commitments. When dissimilar on these characteristics, partners provide less intense forms of support like weapons, money, and logistical aid. I assess my theory through a mixed-methods research design. I conduct statistical analyses on two datasets: first is a novel cross-national, longitudinal dataset of all dyadic provisions of support between government and foreign militants from 1975-2016; second is the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System dyadic events data, which contains daily interactions between state-militant partners from 1995-2017. To assess the underlying mechanism, I conduct three in-depth case studies of state-foreign militant partnerships in the recent Syrian civil war and Iraqi insurgency. My case studies draw on one year of fieldwork in Jordan and 68 interviews conducted in Arabic and English with U.S. and Jordanian officials and Syrian militants. First, I compare the types of support that the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense provided to Syrian militants. I supplement this case study with analysis of a novel data set of over 150 Syrian rebel brigades that received U.S. support between 2012-2017. Second, I compare Hezbollah’s provision of troops and training to the Syrian Armed Forces to its coordination with Russian Special Forces. Lastly, I compare U.S. forces’ formation of joint patrols with and provision of money, weapons, and training to various militias in Anbar in the mid-2000s.