© 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. In (Bonanno, Int J Game Theory 42:567–592, 2013) a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) for extensive-form games was introduced and shown to be intermediate between subgame-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. Besides sequential rationality, the ingredients of the proposed notion are (1) the existence of a plausibility order on the set of histories that rationalizes the given assessment and (2) the notion of Bayesian consistency relative to the plausibility order. We show that a cardinal property of the plausibility order and a strengthening of the notion of Bayesian consistency provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a PBE to be a sequential equilibrium.

Skip to main contentRefine Results Back to Results From: To: Apply Sort By: Relevance A-Z By Title Z-A By Title A-Z By Author Z-A By Author Date Ascending Date Descending Show: 10 20

## Type of Work

Article (13) Book (1) Theses (0) Multimedia (0)

## Peer Review

Peer-reviewed only (14)

## Supplemental Material

Video (0) Audio (0) Images (0) Zip (0) Other files (0)

## Publication Year

## Campus

UC Berkeley (0) UC Davis (13) UC Irvine (1) UCLA (0) UC Merced (0) UC Riverside (0) UC San Diego (0) UCSF (0) UC Santa Barbara (0) UC Santa Cruz (0) UC Office of the President (0) Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (0) UC Agriculture & Natural Resources (0)

## Department

## Journal

## Discipline

## Reuse License

BY-NC-ND - Attribution; NonCommercial use; No derivatives (1)

## Scholarly Works (14 results)

We propose a modal logic based on three operators, representing intial beliefs, information and revised beliefs. Three simple axioms are used to provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the qualitative part of Bayes' rule. Some theorems of this logic are derived concerning the interaction between current beliefs and future beliefs. Information flows and iterated revision are also discussed.

This is an Open Access textbook on non-cooperative Game Theory with 165 solved exercises

© 2014 Elsevier Inc. We investigate an extension of the notion of backward induction to dynamic games with imperfect information and provide a doxastic characterization of it. Extensions of the idea of backward induction were proposed by Penta (2009) and later by Perea (2014), who also provided a doxastic characterization in terms of the notion of common belief of future rationality. The characterization we propose, although differently formulated, is conceptually the same as Perea's and so is the generalization of backward induction. The novelty of this contribution lies in the models that we use, which are dynamic, behavioral models where strategies play no role and the only beliefs that are specified are the actual beliefs of the players at the time of choice. Thus players' beliefs are modeled as temporal, rather than conditional, beliefs and rationality is defined in terms of actual choices, rather than hypothetical plans.

© 2017, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany. Doxastic characterizations of the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes and of the set of backward-induction outcomes are provided for general perfect-information games (where there may be multiple backward-induction solutions). We use models that are behavioral, rather than strategy-based, where a state only specifies the actual play of the game and not the hypothetical choices of the players at nodes that are not reached by the actual play. The analysis is completely free of counterfactuals and no belief revision theory is required, since only the beliefs at reached histories are specified.

We study common belief of rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a model of qualitative beliefs. We characterize the three main solution concepts for such games, viz., Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IDSDS), Iterated Deletion of Boergers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP), by means of gradually restrictive properties imposed on the models of qualitative beliefs. As a corollary, we prove that IDIP refines IDBS, which refines IDSDS.

© 2018 Elsevier Inc. We study common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a qualitative model of beliefs. We characterize two standard solution concepts for such games: the Iterated Deletion of Börgers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and the Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP). We do so by imposing nested restrictions on the doxastic models: namely, the respective epistemic conditions differ in the fact that IDIP requires the truth axiom whereas IDBS does not. Hence, IDIP refines IDBS.

© 2017, University of Szeged. All rights reserved. The existence and the multiplicity of periodic solutions for a parameter dependent second order Hamiltonian system are established via linking theorems. A monotonicity trick is adopted in order to prove the existence of an open interval of parameters for which the problem under consideration admits at least two non trivial qualified solutions.