Sometimes democratic political leaders voluntarily cede the
armed forces too much authority, assigning them positions
that should have gone to civilians. The over-delegation of
posts to soldiers can invite problems of dependency, as civilians
grow accustomed to the military handling defense policy.
This study investigates the delegation of leadership positions
in six advanced democracies: Israel, Taiwan, Spain, the US, the
UK, and France. It finds that in the first three countries officers
dominate many top-tier positions within the defense ministries,
while in the latter three, civilians do. Deficiencies in
civilian control are unexpected since these countries either
face serious external threats or are members of NATO. It is
argued that what links the three countries with civilian deficiencies
is the presence of wide and longstanding gaps
between military and civilian expertise and an absence of
incentives to close them. Where civilians suffer from serious
knowledge deficits, there is often a temptation to defer to the
generals by delegating key ministerial posts to them.
