This paper examines how the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has operated to expand the integration project and has done so by serving as a forum for transnational political action by domestic and supranational policy actors. In particular, I study this integrative dynamic through the evolution of environmental protection policy in the European Union (EU). The purpose of this analysis is to reveal how the Court’s construction of supranational norms operates to fuel the integration process, and often in opposition to national government preferences. The data presented in this analysis pertains to Article 234 (ex Article 177) of the European Community (EC) Treaty. By studying this process, I am able to reveal not only the role of the Court in creating European environmental laws, but the integral role that both national judges and private litigants (individuals and interest groups) play in deepening integration. This study focuses specifically on the environment policy sector, yet provides a general framework for examining the case law in subsequent policy areas, with the purpose of providing a more nuanced understanding of European integration.

This paper contributes to a growing body that strives to create a more nuanced understanding of both European integration and the larger processes of international policy-making (for example, Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997). In particular, this study demonstrates how the ECJ operates to expand the integration project by serving as a forum for transnational political action by domestic and supranational policy actors. I study this integrative dynamic through the evolution of environmental protection in the European Union. My purpose is two-fold. First, I examine the evolution of the Court’s Article 234 case law in this policy sector, focusing on outcomes. In particular, I evaluate whether the policy preferences of national governments have significantly impacted the Court’s decisions. Second, I examine the extent to which the tensions embodied in EU environmental policy have facilitated a dynamic relationship between the Court, private litigants (including interest groups) and national courts, leading to the expansion of supranational policy competence. Specifically, I am interested in determining the extent to which the policy process operates outside the reach of national government control.

In the last forty years, we have witnessed the evolution of an unprecedented form of supranational governance in western Europe. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has played a powerful integrative force in this transformation. This chapter examines how the ECJ has operated to expand the integration project and has done so by serving as a forum for political action by national and transnational social movements. This analysis studies this integrative dynamic through the evolution of sex equality policy in the European Union (EU). The purpose of this chapter is two fold. First, I will examine the Court's expansive development of this EU policy sector through its case law. In particular, I will evaluate whether the policy preferences of national governments have significantly impacted the Court's judicial decisions. Second, I will examine the relationship between the Court and private litigants and women's groups and how this leads to the construction of EU policy through litigation. Specifically, I am interested in tracing the dynamic which has led to the institutionalization of sex equality norms at the European level. The larger purpose of the analysis is to offer systematic evidence of how activists (both national and transnational) are utilizing European space (as provided by EU institutions) and are doing so to bring about significant national policy changes. Furthermore, this project provides empirical evidence of how EU institutions engage in a mutually empowering relationship with activists. This dynamic interaction leads not only to the expansion of EU competence, but also illustrates how both EU institutions and rules have been used in unintended ways.

The need for political participation dominates our theoretical understandings of democratic stability. Furthermore, prevailing democratic political culture models extol a mixed culture of participants and warn of the dangers of wide spread deference. This paper tests the ability of these models to account for democratic societies characterized by high levels of deferential and personalistic political behavior. The analysis examines how a country with highly "authoritarian" social and political structures can establish a stable democracy and sustain it for more than seventy years. The historical and survey data included in this analysis offer evidence of how authoritarianism and personalism are integral elements in sustaining Irish democracy. The findings bring into question dominant explanations for democratic stability and suggest how Eckstein's theory of congruence provides new insights into the puzzle of Irish democracy.