Energy savings performance contracts (ESPCs) are very sensitive to the escalation rates applied to their flow of energy savings. For ESPC deals where annual savings must exceed annual payments (as in the federal sector), these escalation rates dictate the upper limit of the project scope that can be accommodated. The risk of overestimating escalation rates within an ESPC is obvious—actual savings could fall well short of payments made on the project. However, a less understood risk lies in the underestimation of escalation rates; not only can this limit the project’s scope, it can also serve to substantially raise interest costs on the project (since actual dollar savings are underapplied toward annual payments, drawing out the project’s term). Assuming the downsides to over- and under-escalating are equal, the goal in these projects should not be to lowball the expected actual escalation rate, as often occurs, but to make it accurate. The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) developed and manages an energy escalation rates calculator, EERC, that employs the energy price paths forecasted by DOE’s Energy Information Administration (EIA). Because EIA has somewhat underestimated future energy prices in the recent past (since 2000), EERC can be seen as not only a reliable third-party estimate of escalation rates, but also a likely “safe” one (from the risk of overescalation). Its use is recommended, even beyond the federal audience for which it was developed.

Energy savings performance contracts (ESPCs) offer an opportunity to tremendously scale decarbonization projects, given their paid-from-savings premise. However, prospective customers still question whether ESPC is worth the effort and expense. This study evaluates the savings realization rates of ESPCs compared to direct-funded projects using ENERGY STAR Portfolio Manager (ESPM) benchmarking data. It compares normalized EUIs from ESPM before and after energy conservation projects implemented via ESPC or direct funding in roughly 450 federal buildings. This documented change, ideally a savings, can then be compared to the estimated savings from the energy conservation initiative in order to generate a rough realization rate. Preliminary results indicate a notably greater savings realization rate for the ESPC buildings (median = 105% of estimated savings) than those that underwent direct-funded projects (median = 46%). Because of a shortage of good quality data and the wide range in results, the difference is only significant at the p < 0.20 level. However, the higher savings realization of ESPCs corroborates the authors’ 2014 findings using a different comparison method. With continued soft government funding and regulatory impediments for climate change mitigation in the U.S., financed, paid-from-savings project models (e.g., ESPC, PACE, EaaS and others) certainly merit more attention. This study’s results are particularly compelling (and encouraging) given the country’s likely reliance on these vehicles to address existing building retrofits.

Dynamic pricing of electricity, in which retail prices facing customers are responsive to changes in the underlying wholesale markets, represents a step towards economic efficiency in that customers get exposed to some or all of the costs facing wholesale market players. But what do customers who opt for this greater exposure – available in the roughly 15 “de-regulated” states, as well as, to some extent, from some regulated utilities – get in return for their risks? The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) took a retrospective eight-year look at what the savings would have been had they let the loads for which they purchase electricity in the Washington, DC area buy electricity on the real-time pricing (RTP) market – the dynamic pricing option with the highest risk – as opposed to the strategy they chose in actuality, which was fixing flat prices with 3rd-party providers. We found that opting for RTP for the eight years of the study (2005 through 2012) would have resulted in 17% savings, or almost a quarter of a billion dollars, relative to GSA’s actual prices from the 3rd-party suppliers. This is particularly astonishing given that GSA appeared to have timed the market well during the study period, consistently beating the standard offer products provided by the distribution utilities. The issue of budgetary predictability poses an obstacle for customers (especially government ones) considering RTP and, to a lesser extent, other dynamic pricing options. Indeed, GSA would have lost money with RTP in two of the eight years, one of them substantially. But the magnitude of the savings is indisputably compelling and, even if it may be somewhat aberrational due to high congestion in the DC market, begs consideration by large electricity users currently paying to “lock in” fixed flat prices.

Claims that savings realization is greater in energy savings performance contracts (ESPCs) are rampant at least among energy service company representatives and other ESPC cheerleaders. But hard supporting evidence for these claims has been virtually non-existent. The Department of Energy's Federal Energy Management Program uses its Compliance Tracking System (CTS) database to document the performance of federal buildings and projects towards meeting various federal energy-saving goals. This paper focuses on preliminary analysis from CTS to understand and compare the performance of federal ESPCs with projects that have been implemented with more conventional government appropriations funding. The authors have found preliminary evidence using CTS that shows markedly higher savings realization rates among ESPC projects than appropriations-funded ones. There are numerous caveats to the data comparison that clamor for further study, but the difference is still intriguing. If borne out, this finding will provide concrete support to the idea that ESPCs guarantees and measurement and verification, long touted by energy service companies (ESCOs) as offering savings assurance, may truly yield substantial benefits. If ESPCs actually do perform better (i.e., have higher realization rates and savings persistence) than conventional bid-to-spec projects, the perceived premium for conducting them may look like a very good deal after all.

The United States Federal Government has been conducting guaranteed savings energy savings performance contracts for over 20 years and now relies on ESPC for the majority of its energy efficiency work. Along with a related financed project type, these deals resulted in $4.2 billion of project investment in the five years ending in 2016, a pace that has even accelerated since. Measurement and verification (M&V) on the projects is the key to assuring savings realization and persistence. Perceived as a weakness or burdensome added cost in the early years of the program, M&V has become a strength. All energy conservation measures (ECMs) have some form of measurement – defined as a measured baseline establishment followed by at least one measurement of the main energy-saving parameter taken in the performance period for each ECM. The government’s in-house energy consulting office, the Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP), now recommends measurement of these “Option A” M&V ECMs throughout the contract term, usually annually. Moreover, a significantly higher percentage of projects are now characterized by more ambitious M&V, including Option B (all parameter measurement) for most generation (including renewable) and some efficiency measures, and more frequent Option C (whole facility utility bill analysis) for “deep retrofit” projects with multiple, interactive ECMs. Coincident with this progress in M&V has been a much greater embracing of ESPC by the federal agencies, resulting in the enormous rate of projects now executed. This paper traces the evolution of M&V in federal ESPC and argues that the heightened credibility of the savings has contributed significantly to the procurement vehicle’s long-term viability. This focus on savings integrity via M&V has been learned over two decades for U.S. federal ESPC, but countries with developing ESPC markets would be wise to emphasize it as their markets emerge, allowing them to avoid some of the “growing pains” experienced in the U.S.

This paper presents new results on the link between energy factors and commercial mortgage default. First, we summarize results from an empirical analysis of the impact of source energy use intensity (EUI) and electricity prices on mortgage default. We used a unique data set that merges building-level energy use data from city benchmarking ordinances and financial data for commercial mortgages on the same buildings. We found that building source EUI and electricity price are statistically and economically associated with commercial mortgage defaults. Next, we present five case studies on the impact of energy use and price variations on default risk: three office buildings, a hotel, and a multi-family residential building. We use the empirical model coefficients to compute the default risk impacts due to variations in source EUI and electricity price over the course of the mortgage term. We found that variations in source EUI could raise or lower the default rates in these properties by between 5% and 40%, depending on the property type and geography. Electricity pricing has an even greater effect – roughly 60% change in default rate in the Denver area and nearly 90% in northern California. Finally, we propose an energy risk score that lenders can use to assess energy risk and inform mortgage terms. The score is being developed and piloted in collaboration with three mortgage lenders. We conclude with implications of this score as a market signal and mechanism for incentivizing energy efficiency investments through the commercial mortgage channel.