INTRODUCTION In the following essays we focus on the ways in which contemporary governments currently operate among several American Indian tribes. All of the inquiries are born of relatively long-term contacts with the tribes-contacts that began in the 1960s or 70s and have continued to the present. Immediately prior to our first-hand contact with these tribes, they had experienced about a decade in which Federal policies sought to terminate them from trust status and Federal obligations. Some of us began our studies as Johnson Administration policies began to alleviate Indian fears about imminent termination. Policies set in motion by the Nixon Administration offered new meaning to "self-determination" among Indian tribes. We observed, even participated in, some of the Indian responses to self-determination programs. They were short-lived, but very influential during their effective lives. With the advent of Reagan's "New Federalism" we have observed the empirical consequences to Federal programs enabled by self-determination legislation when Federal funds are withdrawn. We assess the consequences of policy decisions on the several tribes that we have come to know through research and assistance over the past ten to twenty years.

I have no issue and took no issue in these pages with the case law on which Federal District Judge H. Russel Holland based his grant of Exxon’s motion for summary judgment on native claims for noneconomic injury in relation to the infamous oil spill of the Exxon Valdez (Order No. 190 in the U.S. District Court of Alaska, 23 March 1994) [henceforth #1901. Whereas I take exception with some minor issues in the judge’s response, here and in the original article in these pages I focus on his egregious mistakes. As minor issues go, a casual reading of my article demonstrates that I did not identify the precise amount that attorneys for commercial fishermen or the claimants shall collect from judgments against Exxon, nor did I identify the precise amount that native claimants or their attorneys shall receive from their settlement with Exxon. The more serious mistakes are his unwarranted assertions about differences between natives and nonnatives. I take the judge at his word that he arrived at his misconceptions independently of Bohannon’s similar errors. Let me once again assess Judge Holland’s bent for generalizing in the absence of evidence. To be courteous, his generalizations might be framed as hypotheses. To be accurate, his generalizations are unwarranted assertions. It was the unwarranted nature of his assertions, rich throughout his decision and consonant with similar assertions made by Exxon's anthropological expert, that drew comment from me in "Ethnicity, Not Culture? . . ."

INTRODUCTION In 1983, prompted by allegations that there were some economic successes among tribes rich in energy resources, I initiated research among two tribes that were most frequently cited as successful: the Northern Ute (Uintah and Ouray Ute Indian Reservation) of eastern Utah, and the Crow of south-central Montana. Inasmuch as my colleagues and I had been monitoring energy resource-rich tribes for about twelve years and not one of us had observed the development of a profitable, self-sustaining economic base among the reservation societies that we had studied, I was skeptical of the claims for economic successes. The skepticism was not borne solely of observations. I was also skeptical because of my knowledge of the political-economic niche that American Indians have occupied since subjugation, but puzzled as to whether Federal Indian legislation of the 1970s had made such a difference as to facilitate development. The Reagan Administration's "New Federalism" had been rolling on line for two years, the Indian Self-Determination Act for eight years, the Indian Financing Act for nine years, and the rapid extraction of Indian-owned energy resources for ten years (following the Arab oil embargo) when my students, Stephanie Reynolds Romeo, LaVerna Price, and JoAnna Endter, and I began our inquiry among the Northern Utes and Crows. If these tribes had been successful in implementing the provisions of the

INTRODUCTION On 29 March 1989, the Exxon Valdez foundered on Bligh Reef just outside the Valdez Arm of Prince William Sound. Nearly eleven million gallons of crude oil spilled through the ship’s ruptured hull. An oil slick and oil balls drifted with tides and currents throughout large portions of Prince William Sound, southwest down the Kenai Peninsula to Kodiak Island, and then northeast into Cook Inlet. The consequences for the native and nonnative residents of the oiled area were many. One of the damage suits brought against Exxon Corporation was filed by a group of Native American residents from villages in the spill area who sought compensation for the damage the spill inflicted on their culture, and for cultural deprivation resulting from damage. The assertions made by social scientists for the native plaintiffs that their culture had been damaged; the assertion made by a social scientist for the respondent, Exxon Corporation, that native culture had been “smashed” centuries prior to the spill and that the modest differences between natives and nonnatives in the spill area at the time of the spill were “ethnic” only; and the decision of the federal judge at least in part informed by this “expert” testimony” constitute the occasion for this analysis. The consequences of the bad and irresponsible social science used in informing attorneys for both sides and informing the judge were serious and injured the natives.

A mere four years ago in Tulsa, Oklahoma a knowledgeable group of American Indians and scholars of American Indian topics gathered to forecast the future of American Indian sovereignty, economics, relations with governments, and general well-being. With far too much temerity I stood in front of the gathering to forecast American Indian economic development. As was my wont after nearly forty years of observation and analysis of Indian economic ventures, particularly agriculture, but also recreation, industrial park, mining, energy, and sundry smaller business activities, I assumed that the future of economic developments among America's Indian tribes would be similar to past attempts to develop Indian economies. Indeed, I argued that it was wise to accept David Hume's proposition that the past is the best predictor of the future for social phenomena? Hence, I foresaw nothing but failures, the exception being the maquiladora-like assembly operations owned and managed by the Mississippi Choctaw.