This is an ethnographic study of the role of legislatures in post-conflict democracy. Focusing primarily on the Northern Ireland Assembly, with comparative attention to the United States Congress, I argue that the symbolic nature of legislatures is both understudied and often contradictory to the lawmaking process. The paradox of legislatures is that the institutions serve both as symbols of peace and effective liberal democracy (and thus are ideal types of the lawmaking process) yet they are also as forums for the conflict of politically polarized parties (which can undercut the delivery of effective governance). This contradiction creates a dysfunctional barrier to practical lawmaking and policy development. However, I argue that for sites of conflict and post-conflict transition, the symbolism of the legislature can sometimes outweigh its efficacy as a policy-making site. Even if the typical functions of a legislature are not happening, the legislature serves as a site of non-violent conflict and, thus, has an underappreciated role in the peacebuilding process.