This article aims to account for students' assessments of the plausibility and applicability of analogical explanations, and individual differences in these assessments, by analyzing properties of students' underlying knowledge systems. We developed a model of explanation and change in explanation focusing on knowledge elements that provide a sense of satisfaction to those judging the explanation. We call these elements "explanatory primitives." In this model, explanations are accepted or rejected on the basis of (a) the individual's convictions concerning particular explanatory primitives and (b) the fit of these primitives to current circumstances. Data are drawn from clinical interviews with three high school students who worked through a bridging analogies tutoring sequence on the existence of the normal force in mechanics. Methodologically, our work involves fine-grain analysis of process data and explicit principles of empirical accountability; we believe it marks a methodological advance over most previously reported empirical studies of analogical reasoning. © 2012 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.