“Slavery ended in the United States because slavery is morally wrong.” This explanation does not seem to fit the typical criteria for explaining an event, since it appeals to ethics rather than causal factors as the reason for this social change. But do people perceive these ethical claims as explanatory, and if so, why? In Study 1, we find that people accept ethical explanations for social change and that this is predicted by their meta-ethical beliefs in moral progress and moral objectivism, suggesting that they treat morality somewhat akin to a causal force. In Study 2, we find that people recognize this relationship between ethical explanations and meta-ethical commitments, using the former to make inferences about individuals’ beliefs in moral progress and objectivism. Together these studies demonstrate that our moral commitments shape our judgments of explanations and that explanations shape our moral inferences about others.

Many consider the world to be morally better today than it was in the past and expect moral improvement to continue. How do people explain what drives this change? We identify two ways people might think about how moral progress occurs: that it is inevitable or driven by human action. In Study 1 (N=149), we find that those who more strongly believe that moral progress is driven by human action are more likely to believe that their own intervention is warranted to correct a moral setback. In Study 2 (N=145), we find that this translates to action: those who more strongly believe that moral progress is driven by human action report that they would donate more money to correct a moral setback. Together these studies suggest that beliefs about the mechanisms of moral progress have important implications for engaging in political action.

Suppose humans exist in order to reproduce. Does it follow that an individual who chooses not to reproduce is committing a moral wrong? Past work suggests that, right or wrong, beliefs about species-level purpose are associated with moral condemnation of individuals who choose not to fulfill that purpose. Across two experiments we investigate why. Experiment 1 replicates a causal effect of species-level purpose on moral condemnation. Experiment 2 finds evidence that when a species is believed to exist to perform some action, people infer that the action is good for the species, and that this belief in turn supports moral condemnation of individuals who choose not to perform the action. Together, these findings shed light on how our descriptive understanding can sometimes shape our prescriptive judgments.

Explanations can be divided into two categories: those that appeal to general principles (abstractive) and those that tella concrete story (experiential) (Aronowitz & Lombrozo, 2019). Most psychological research has focused on abstractiveexplanations, identifying the benefits of abstraction for transfer (Ratterman, Genter & DeLoache, 1987;1989), prediction(Pacer & Lombrozo, 2017), and even cooperation (Burgoon, Henders & Markman, 2013). So why do we sometimesexplain in a less abstract, more narrative mode? Study 1 (N = 195) and Study 2 (N = 843) explore scientific explanationsand find that abstractive and experiential explanations (matched for quality) are transmitted along a chain of people withcomparable fidelity. However, over repeated transmission, experiential explanations become significantly more abstract -whereas abstractive explanations do not drift. Study 3 turns from science to human behavior to test the hypothesis thatexperiential explanations have mnemonic and other cognitive advantages in more narrative domains.

People often endorse explanations in terms of purposes or goals (e.g., pencils exist so that people can write with them), evenwhen these teleological explanations are scientifically unwarranted (e.g., water exists so that life can survive on Earth). Inthe present research, we explore teleological endorsement in a novel domainhuman purposeand its relationship to moraljudgments. Across two studies, we find evidence that people endorse the claim that humans exist for a purpose (e.g.,to procreate, to help others) and that these beliefs relate to moral judgments against purpose violations (e.g., condemningthose who do not procreate, or do not help others). We also find evidence of a bi-directional causal relationship: teleologicalclaims about a species result in moral condemnation of purpose violations, and stipulating that an action is immoralincreases endorsement that the species exists for that purpose.

Reducing inequality, mitigating climate change, and responding to public health crises are large-scale goals that require the cooperation and coordination of many individuals. These goals cannot be achieved by one individual alone, and contributing is not always beneficial to each individual. And yet, individuals must contribute in order to make a difference. How do we hold individuals and groups responsible for collective action?