Canonical models of crime emphasize economic incentives. Yet, causal evidence of sorting into criminal occupations in response to individual-level variation in incentives is limited. We link administrative socioeconomic microdata with the universe of arrests in Medellín over a decade. We exploit exogenous variation in formal-sector employment around a socioeconomic-score cutoff, below which individuals receive benefits if not formally employed, to test whether a higher cost to formal-sector employment induces crime. Regression discontinuity estimates show this policy generated reductions in formal-sector employment and a corresponding spike in organized crime, but no effects on crimes of impulse or opportunity.

We investigate the effects of job displacement, as a result of mass layoffs, on criminal arrests using a matched employer-employee crime dataset from Medellín, Colombia. Job displacement leads to immediate and persistent earnings losses and higher probability of arrest for both the displaced worker and family members. Leveraging a banking policy reform, we find that greater access to credit attenuates the criminal response to job loss. Impacts on arrests are pronounced for property crimes and among younger men for whom opportunities in criminal enterprises are prevalent. Taken together, our results are consistent with economic incentives contributing to criminal participation decisions after job losses. (JEL G21, G51, J63, K42, O16, O17)