In this article, I assess the state of political citizenship in rural China. After discussing the often local and rural origins of citizenship and the meaning of the term itself, I review the limited reforms that have taken place in the election of high-ranking state leaders and people's congress deputies. I then turn to a more promising avenue of inclusion: the villagers' committee (VC) elections that began in the late 1980s. Here, we see notable efforts to heighten cadre responsiveness and draw rural residents into the local polity. At the same time, sizable obstacles to inclusion remain, not least because many electoral rules and practices do not enfranchise villagers reliably. The inescapable conclusion that villagers enjoy (at best) a partial citizenship needs to be qualified, however, owing to evidence that some rural people are starting to challenge improper elections using the language of rights. Building on a rules consciousness and a sensitivity to government rhetoric that have existed for centuries, as well as exploiting the spread of participatory ideologies and patterns of rule rooted in notions of equality, rights, and the rule of law, these villagers are busy advancing their interests within prevailing limits, forcing open blocked channels of participation, and struggling to make still-disputed rights real. In this regard, certain citizenship practices are emerging even before citizenship has appeared as a fully recognized status, and we may be observing the process by which a more complete citizenship comes about.

James Scott (1985) placed 'everyday forms of resistance' between quiescence and rebellion. Others have noted that defiance in unpromising circumstances need not be quiet, disguised and anonymous if the aggrieved use the language of power to mitigate the risks of confrontation. How does 'rightful resistance' (O'Brien and Li 2006) relate to Scott's everyday resistance and other types of protest in contemporary China? Are rightful resisters sincere or strategic? Is their contention reactive or proactive? Does rightful resistance suggest growing rights consciousness or only a familiar rules consciousness? Rightful resistance in rural China has been criticized for (1) lacking 'peasantness', (2) shortchanging history and culture, (3) focusing on elite allies and one pattern of protest and (4) being overly rationalist, state-centric and caught in 'developmental thinking'. How do I respond?. © 2013 © 2013 Taylor & Francis.

Bringing knowledge about China to the disciplines has reduced the outsized role that research on Europe and America has on many topics. But mainstreaming China studies also leads to certain tradeoffs. How should we manage these tradeoffs and produce research that is both true to China and contributes to the social sciences? In the last 40 years, China scholars have developed many strategies to navigate the territory between area studies and the social sciences. I myself have vacillated about how China studies and political science should interact and inform each other. How are scholars addressing this issue now, in an era of mixed methods, sophisticated quantitative research, experiments and "big data?"

Many scholars have analysed bargaining between supervisory bureaucracies and Chinese large and medium-sized factories. Walder identified a web of informal, semi-bureaucratic relationships that structures negotiations over revenues, payments and subsidies. Granick and Tidrick pointed out that divided bureaucratic control increases the parties to bargaining, while conflicting interests present opportunities to play supervisors off against each other. Huang found collusive behaviour that occurs when local government agencies and firms rob the state treasury by increasing central subsidies and reducing central exactions in exchange for fees that go directly to local coffers. Numerous authors have noted that the focus of bargaining has shifted from material to financial transfers and have used (or questioned using) Kornai's “soft budget constraint” to explain the persistence of bargaining since the onset of reform.

Critical deputy speeches and opposition to draft bankruptcy, enterprise, and villager committee laws have led some observers to conclude that the National People's Congress (NPC) is a conservative, obstructionist force in Chinese politics. This article reviews the evidence for this claim and finds that the NPC's institutional impact is more accurately described as procedurally conservative than as substantively conservative. Not a staunch opponent of market reforms nor of redefining the role of the Communist Party, the legislature instead stands for rationalizing and legalizing policymaking and for guaranteeing policy implementation; it weighs in on the side of caution, carefully-planned change, and minimizing risks, and against campaign-style politics and reliance on revolutionary enthusiasm and charisma.

As repression grows in China, some pastors, lawyers, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are neither resisting it nor withdrawing from the public sphere, but instead are finding ways to adapt. Coping strategies include the following: being transparent about their activities and maintaining close communication with the authorities; cultivating allies in the government and giving credit to officials for their achievements; keeping the size of their organizations nonthreatening and consenting to a heightened party presence; staying a safe distance from “red lines” and focusing on less controversial issues; encouraging their constituents to accept compromises and government priorities; distancing themselves from activists who speak out against restrictions; shedding connections with foreign countries; and arguing that loyalty and moderation are the best means to make progress. The hope is that cooperation and exhibiting an understanding view of the Chinese Communist Party’s motives will preserve space to operate and suggest a path toward long-term coexistence. Accommodating pastors, lawyers, and NGOs take the regime as a given and work with the state rather than against it. By doing so, they retain some agency, even as deepening authoritarianism blurs the line between accommodation and co-optation. Potentially restive professionals are directed away from activities and ways of thinking that the authorities do not like and toward organizing themselves and acting in a manner that is deemed acceptable. They learn to avoid confrontation while they are steered to a safe place and rewarded (or at least tolerated) if they stay there.

The relationship between area studies and political science is fraught with tradeoffs. In particular, a danger exists that the field of Chinese politics is being hollowed out because (a) there are many islands of highly specialized research with few bridges between them; and (b) more and more Chinese politics scholars are engaged in debates in which the 'other side' is no longer a China scholar but instead a colleague in the discipline. At a time when China's economic growth and prominence in world affairs have generated remarkable interest inside and outside the academy, few scholars are willing to take a stab at characterizing the polity or addressing other, equally large questions. Further thought is needed about the 'terms of enlistment' for China scholars in political science, in an era when ever more-focused studies and greater participation in disciplinary debates have become the norm. © 2011 Taylor & Francis.