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Open Access Publications from the University of California

Scholarly Works (171 results)

  • Article
  • Peer Reviewed
UC San Diego Previously Published Works (2013)
I describe ten situations in which experimental data may provide useful guidance to the study of cheap-talk games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C92, D8. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.
    Cover page: Ten possible experiments on communication and deception
    • Article
    • Peer Reviewed
    UC San Diego Previously Published Works (2019)
    This paper extends Milgrom and Robert's treatment of supermodular games in two ways. It points out that their main characterization result holds under a weaker assumption. It refines the arguments to provide bounds on the set of strategies that survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. I derive the bounds by iterating the best-response correspondence. I give conditions under which they are independent of the order of deletion of dominated strategies. The results have implications for equilibrium selection and dynamic stability in games.
      Cover page: Iterated weak dominance and interval‐dominance supermodular games
      • Article
      Recent Work (1998)

      Given n agents with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions who wish to divide m commodities, consider the n-person noncooperative game with strategies consisting of concave, increasing von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, and whose outcomes are the relative utilitarian solution. It is shown that any constrained equal-income competitive equilibrium allocation for the true utilities is a Nash equilibrium outcome for the noncooperative game. Conditions are presented under which these are the only pure strategy equilibrium outcomes.

        Cover page: Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism
        • Article
        • Peer Reviewed
        UC San Diego Previously Published Works (2020)
          Cover page: Lying and Deception in Games
          • Article
          • Peer Reviewed
          UC San Diego Previously Published Works (2014)
          Each member of a group receives a signal about the unknown state of the world and decides on a utility-maximizing recommendation on the basis of that signal. The individuals have identical preferences. The group makes a decision that maximizes the common utility function assuming perfect pooling of the information in individual signals. An action profile is a group action and a recommendation from each individual. A collection of action profiles is rational if there exists an information structure under which all elements in the collection arise with positive probability. With no restrictions on the information structure, essentially all action profiles are rational. In fact, given any distribution over action profiles, it is possible to find an information structure that approximates the distribution. In a monotone environment in which individuals receive conditionally independent signals, essentially any single action profile is rational, although some collections of action profiles are not. © 2014 Joel Sobel.
            Cover page: On the relationship between individual and group decisions
            • Article
            • Peer Reviewed
            UC San Diego Previously Published Works (2019)
              Cover page: What Makes Money Work?
              • Article
              • Peer Reviewed
              UC San Diego Previously Published Works (2017)
                Cover page: A note on pre-play communication
                • Article
                • Peer Reviewed
                UC San Diego Previously Published Works (2015)
                Experiments identify the empirical regularity that groups tend to make decisions that are more extreme, but in the same direction as the tendency of individual members of the group. We present a model of information aggregation consistent with these findings. We assume individuals and groups are rational decision makers facing monotone statistical decision problems where groups and individuals have common preferences, but groups have superior information. We provide conditions under which the distribution of the optimal actions of the group is more variable than the distribution of actions taken by individuals.
                  Cover page: Group Polarization in a Model of Information Aggregation
                  • Thesis
                  • Peer Reviewed
                  UC Irvine Electronic Theses and Dissertations (2015)

                  Mini-CAPTAIN is a 400 kg liquid argon time projection chamber (TPC) and serves as a prototype for the 5 ton CAPTAIN detector. Cosmic muons are the primary data source for its commissioning phase. These particles are tracked by the muon telescope, consisting of multi-wire chambers for data collection and scintillator paddles for triggering. Telescope event reconstruction, track extrapolation into the TPC, and correlation of events between these two detector systems will be discussed. I will demonstrate that telescope events can be used to calculate which TPC wires are good candidates for seeing a muon signal. While a full muon track has not yet been seen in TPC data due to high electronic noise and insufficient liquid argon purity, the analysis programs detailed in this paper will expedite track finding once new data has been collected. This work can also be used to align the TPC before it takes data in a beam.

                    Cover page: Muon Telescope and TPC Data Analysis for mini-CAPTAINCreative Commons 'BY' version 4.0 license
                    • Article
                    • Peer Reviewed
                    UC San Diego Previously Published Works (2019)
                    The American Economic Association awarded Parag Pathak the 2018 John Bates Clark Medal for his research on the impacts of educational policies. Both the theory and the empirical research take the constraints facing administrators seriously. As a result, Parag’s research led directly to educational reforms in many large US cities and abroad. The leading example is Parag (and co-authors’) research on school assignment mechanisms that led many school districts to institute fairer and more efficient procedures for allocating students to schools. The institutional detail Parag learned in working on the assignment problem led to innovative empirical work on the impacts of different types of schools, most notably of charters, which was suggestive of the characteristics of both successful schools and of the types of students who gained from being enrolled in them. Using the data generated by the new assignment rules, his recent work provides complete frameworks for the quantitative analysis of the benefits of different assignment mechanisms and has measured those benefits in New York high schools.
                      Cover page: Parag Pathak: Winner of the 2018 Clark Medal
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