What is the political impact of prison privatization? Does prison privatization introduce a new political interest group into the criminal justice sphere? Do private prison firms have an incentive to push for increased incarceration and do they have the power to succeed? How similar, or different, are the political goals and strategies of private prison firms from other groups interested in the operation of prisons, such as corrections officer unions?

I argue that the structure of firms sets them apart from other interest groups. The benefits of growth flow to all shareholders in a firm, and all shareholders have a stake in the increasing profitability of the firm they own. This aligns the concerns of shareholders and reduces conflict. In contrast, other groups often have constituents and stakeholders with conflicting interests. Labor unions, another politically influential type of interest group, have a fraught relationship with growth. If a labor union grows in size, many of the benefits flow not to the incumbent union members, but rather to new union members. I argue that this distinction between firms and labor unions should manifest in different political strategies where firms are more likely to adopt pro- active political strategies aimed at increasing market share and profit, whereas labor unions will adopt defensive political strategies aimed at safeguarding the position of their current members. This implies that private prison firms have much more to gain from increased incarceration than do corrections officer unions. I compare the political activities of private prison firms and corrections officer unions and show that private prison firms do appear to value increased incarceration more than corrections officer unions. Drawing on a time series cross-sectional model, I show that privatization appears to drive increased incarceration in states within the United States. These results are robust to a variety of model specifications. These results are not driven by political shifts, crime rates, or cost savings.

This dissertation also describes the results of a series of interviews with state legislators and lobbyists. Across states, these subject matter experts believe private prison firms are more politically proactive, more politically sophisticated, and more supportive of increased incarceration than are corrections officer unions.