This paper presents analysis of contractual settings with complete but unverifiable information and where trade consists of a sequence of verifiable productive actions, between which renegotiation can occur. The main result identifies an equivalent, simplified model that can be used to calculate the set of implementable value functions. The result also shows that the detrimental effects of renegotiation between productive actions can be counteracted when the parties can sufficiently communicate with the external enforcer over time. Corollary results address the form of optimal contracts and the effect of irreversible productive actions.

This visual essay is an edited transcript of a presentation delivered by Judy Watson given in the 2021 symposium “Grounded in Place: Dialogues Between First Nations Artists from Australia, Taiwan, and Aotearoa.” The artist speaks of her Waanyi Country, near Boodjamulla National Park (Lawn Hill Gorge) in north-west Queensland, Australia, and discusses a number of her artworks that reflect her ongoing investigation into water, massacres, and connections to Country.

In this digital graphic novel, a neurodivergent teenager’s underwater journey through Monterey Submarine Canyon reveals that sensory differences are powerful adaptations, exploring how her sensitivities to light, noise, and touch correspond to deep sea conditions such as darkness, quiet, and pressure. The graphic novel is hosted online as a website, which also includes a fully narrated, sound mixed, and captioned video version of the underwater journey.

See media created for this project here: https://swimdown.neocities.org/

This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying contract and enforcement in setting of complete, but unverifiable, information. The main point of the paper is that the consideration of renegotiation necessitates formal examination of other technological constraints, especially those having to do with the timing and nature of inalienable productive decisions. The main technical contributions include (a) results that characterize of the sets of implementable state-contingent payoffs under various assumptions about renegotiation opportunities, and (b) a result establishing conditions under which, when trading opportunities are durable and trade decisions are reversible, stationary contracts are optimal. The analysis refutes the validity of the "mechanism design with ex post renegotiation" program, it demonstrates the validity of other mechanism design models in dynamic environments, and it highlights the need for a more structured game-theoretic framework.

This paper reports the analysis of a general model of contract in multi-period settings with both external and self-enforcement. In the model, players alternately engage in contract negotiation and take individual actions. A notion of contractual equilibrium, which combines a bargaining solution and individual incentive constraints, is proposed and analyzed. The modeling framework helps identify the relation between the manner in which players negotiate and the outcome of the long-term contractual relationship. In particular, the model shows the importance of accounting for the selfenforced component of contract in the negotiation process. Examples and guidance for applications are provided.