A common assumption in the philosophical literature on joint action is that individual-level action is both ontologicallyand explanatorily prior to collective action: in this view, joint action emerges fromand is therefore best explained in termsofindividual-level mental (intentional, propositional) states. This leads to the awkward position of attributing individual-like minds to groups. But assigning priority to the collective level is equally unsatisfactory. Here I draw from radicalembodied cognitive science to offer a level-neutral alternative. Whether individual or joint, successful action is properlyunderstood as the soft-assembly of a synergistic system, i.e., a higher-order control system exhibiting dimensional com-pression and reciprocal compensation. This level-neutral lens of synergistic dynamics helps elucidate the circular relationbetween individual and collective action: joint action recruits individual-level motor/cognitive mechanisms, yet individual-level mechanisms only emerge through development in social settingsresulting in a nested, self-reinforcing coordinativestructure for action, both individual and collective.