Taken from the content of the October 1992 meeting on Space Monitoring and Global Change, the contents of this IGCC paper range from means of assuring global cooperation in earth observation, potential systems and the practical difficulties of assembling and managing such systems.
What follows the Cold War? Even the fact that the question can be asked isastounding. Shall the sequel be "peaceful competition" (Gorbachev), "cold peace and peaceful competition" (The New York Times editorial of August 10, 1987), "stable coexistence" (the American Committee on U. S.-Soviet Relations, including Arthur Macy Cox, William Colby, and George Ball)- or, grudgingly, "steps ... to reconcile vital U. S. and Soviet interests" (Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance)? There is dispute and confusion in both camps over what the new relationship is, what to call it. As the American establishment reorganizes its understanding of the world, theAmerican right is not silent. It is therefore useful to monitor the right's reactions to East-West rapprochement. In these notes, I look at the American right's responses to the East-West relaxation marked by the Washington and Moscow summits and the signing of the INF treaty. The discourse of the right in the first half of 1988 offers a preview of how it may be expected to react during the years to come.
If we need a new language of national and international politics in order to think differently so as to cope with the dangers of a nuclear world, we also need a new language of policy analysis to examine the structures and processes by which defense policy in general, and nuclear policy in particular, is made. What is needed, as a start, is a new lexicon of basic terms derived from language and discourse but applied to the policy process. We might then begin to develop this new vocabulary into an effective critique of defense decision making in the modern or indeed, the post-modern state.
The concept of a "nuclear winter" has effected a turn in the discourse on nuclear war, which had long focused on imagery related to the initial blast and immediate after-effects. The paper discusses the origin of the nuclear winter theory and how it has influenced the nuclear debate.
This publication dicusses the interplay between various political factions, the scientific community and the media regarding the rise and decline of the SDI program in the 1980s. It also explores the implications of ABM technologies and the responsibilities of various parties in its development.
This paper is the beginning of an analysis of the nature of nuclear strategic thinking; its emphasis is on the role of a specialized language that I call "technostrategic." I have come to believe that this language both reflects and shapes the nature ofthe American nuclear strategic project; that it plays a central role in allowing defenseintellectuals to think and act as they do; and that all of us who are concerned about nuclear weaponry and nuclear war must give careful attention to the role of language we and others choose to use -- who it allows us to communicate with, and what it allows us to think as well as say.
"The Soviet threat" has provided a frame of reference for American politics since shortlyafter the end of World War II. Demonstrating, measuring, and responding to "the threat" have been subjects of intense concern and debate. The reality of "the threat" has been taken for granted. The paper examines the origins and reproduction of the Soviet threat" in American politics. This is not an analysis of whether or not the threat is or has been "real." Rather, it is a study of how Americans have come to regard it as real. The distinction is crucial: we are dealing with the sociology of knowledge and the politics of representation. We are interested in seeing how and why a society constructs an enemy.
This paper discusses how the British popular press (tabloids) covered the visit of the British Prime Minister to Moscow for talks with the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, about arms control and other matters of mutual interest. It concentrates on the geopolitical significance of the visit and the coverage--their relevance to the prospects for nuclear arms reductions on both sides of the Iron Curtain.
This paper traces the way in which "quality papers" such as the Economist helped to convince European opinion leaders of the advantages of President Reagan's so-called Strategic Defense Initiative. The paper proceeds in the following way: It first outlines the presentation of the issue, sketching typical references to SDI and the arguments in favor of it. It then compares the presentation of the protagonists: Reagan as the champion of the free world and Gorbachev as the new representative of Soviet Russia. Finally, it summarizes the metaphors of good and evil.
This study suggests the value of a "multi-feature/multi-dimension" method of discourse analysis (Biber in press) to the study of nuclear discourse by reporting some of the results of a pilot study of four different written texts about the nuclear dilemma. The quantitative results showthe texts to differ in their uses of groups of concurring linguistic features and motivate a microanalysis of the texts seeking to discern the author's underlying assumptions about the relations of the United States and the Soviet Union to each other and to their nuclear weapons. The results also extend the work of James Wertsch (1987) in constructing a typology of modes ofnuclear discourse by (1) describing concrete lexical and syntactic variation between nuclear discourse texts and between nuclear discourse, as a subgenre, and other written and spoken genres of English, (2) ascribing general rhetorical strategies to different authors' "styles" of nuclear discourse identified by the quantitative analysis, and (3) associating these "styles" of nuclear discourse with some aspects of the authors' world-views which form their cognitive foundations.