UC Santa Cruz

The aim of this work is to demarcate, develop, and defend the commitments and

consequences of metaethical minimalism. Very roughly, this is the position that a

commitment to objective moral truths does not require any accompanying ontological

commitments. While there are few, if any, who call themselves “metaethical minimalists”, I

endeavor to uncover existing articulations of metaethical minimalism which have been

presented under different names, attempting to identify the common ground between

them. As I interpret the position, all metaethical minimalists are committed to the same

positive pair of claims (what I call the Objectivity Thesis): “a) Moral truths are strongly

mind-independent; b) there are moral truths.” Taken by itself, however, this pair of claims

is not sufficient for differentiating their view from the moral realist’s. Consequently, the

minimalist must also articulate that which they are denying about the non-minimalist

approach, or what I call the “negative ontological thesis”. I offer my own version of this

negative thesis and argue for its dialectical advantages.

In Chapters 3 and 4, I focus my attention on attacks on the viability of metaethical

minimalism in the form of two “challenges” that aim to problematize a commitment to

objective moral truths absent any accompanying ontological commitment. The

big-picture takeaway from these chapters is that minimalism can defend itself by playing to

the dialectical advantage I find for it in Chapter 2 as well as by being creative about

minimalist constructions/reworkings of plausible principles/lines of reasoning that seem

to contradict it.

The temptation to embrace quietism is strong among minimalists, but in Chapters

5, 6, and 7 I aim to show that there is a positive alternative available for the minimalist

interested in developing a full picture of their position. Chapter 5 is aimed at providing an

adequate understanding of the distinction between the objects of purely normative

thoughts and objects of thoughts about reality. Building on this are Chapters 6 and 7,

which argue in favor of an account of the relationship between emotion and evaluative

knowledge that is consistent with metaethical minimalism.