UCLA

Traditional deterrence frameworks fail to explain the persistent instability of asymmetric, enduring conflicts like the one between Israel and Hamas. These conflicts may involve deterrence-oriented violence and may feature deterrence success. Yet, they may not have stable deterrence equilibria. Instead, they cycle through periods of restraint, low-intensity conflict and warfare – driven, in part, by deterrence dynamics. This dissertation explores these dynamics using a mixed-methods approach, including simulations, quantitative analysis of events data, and qualitative case studies.First, it constructs a sophisticated formal model combining foundational elements of war-of-attrition, deterrence, and coercive bargaining models. It then employs simulations of this model to investigate how varying critical parameters – such as the intensity of retaliatory measures, the effectiveness of deterrence-by-denial, and rearmament rates – influences the emergence and persistence of cyclical conflict patterns within repeated strategic interactions and adaptive learning environments.Second, it derives hypotheses based on these results and on complementary insights from the deterrence literature. Using quantitative methods, it tests these hypotheses against the empirical record (specifically Hamas-Israel conflict events data for the period between 2008-2023 derived from the GDELT, GTD, ACLED and GED datasets).Third, the study stages a qualitative paired comparison of two crises from this period: one that escalated into war (Operation Cast Lead, 2008–2009) and one that did not (the Great March of Return, 2018). We test the deterrence theories introduced in part one by identifying which predictors of deterrence success and failure were present in each case.Though the dissertation is exploratory, a number of preliminary findings do emerge from this study. Among them are the following:Cyclical Deterrence Patterns: Durable, stable deterrence rarely emerges in both simulated enduring rivalries and in the real-world rivalry between Hamas and Israel; instead, cycles of restraint, escalation, and recovery tend to repeat.Retaliation Intensity: Deterrence is most stable when retaliation is neither too lenient nor excessively punitive. Both restraint and over response are associated with subsequent deterrence failure.Denial Strategies: Deterrence-by-denial can extend periods of calm but fails when it is not supplemented by the credible threat of retaliation.Rapid Rearmament Effects: Rapid rearmament by the weaker actor reduces the interval between conflicts.Adaptive Learning: The logic of iterative Bayesian updating, which should lead belligerents towards a mutual understanding regarding the relative balance of capabilities and resolve, is disrupted by "tactical learning" whereby belligerents constantly innovate around one another's strengths and adapt new defenses. This prevents the emergence of a stable deterrent equilibrium.Immediacy and Consistency: Retaliation that is both prompt and predictable tends to strengthen deterrence; delays or inconsistency have the opposite effect.Threat Credibility: Failure to follow through on a threat undermines credibility and can embolden further challenges.Third Party Effects: Shifts in external patronage alter Hamas’s strategic calculations and can change escalation patterns.Election Cycles and Domestic Politics: Domestic political events in Israel and Palestine, including election cycles, coalition negotiations and factional competition can precipitate conflict between Hamas and Israel