UC Merced

Individuals often face decisions in which the consequences of their actions for others are uncertain, and in many cases this uncertainty is actively maintained. A growing literature documents that individuals avoid information about the social consequences of their choices, a behavior commonly referred to as strategic ignorance. This dissertation argues that such ignorance is not merely an individual choice, but a socially embedded phenomenon shaped by interactions with others, internalized norms, and beliefs about the behavior of others. Using a series of experiments based on moral wiggle room environments, I examine how different features of the social context influence both the willingness to acquire information and the behavioral consequences of remaining ignorant. The results reveal a striking asymmetry: while many individuals avoid acquiring information themselves, others are readily willing to provide it. When information is imposed, a substantial share of decision-makers revise their choices in a more prosocial direction, demonstrating that ignorance—and its behavioral consequences—can be constrained by others. At the same time, prompting individuals to consider what constitutes appropriate behavior prior to making a decision increases prosocial actions, consistent with the activation of latent norms, whereas eliciting such beliefs after decisions instead reflects post-hoc justification. In addition, individuals respond to information about the behavior of others by aligning both their information acquisition and allocation choices with perceived norms. Taken together, these findings provide a unified account of moral decision-making in which behavior is shaped by a layered system of enforcement, ranging from external interventions to fully internalized regulation. The results highlight that the key determinant of behavior is not only what individuals know, but how the social environment shapes what they choose not to know.