The UC Santa Barbara Undergraduate Journal of History

Edward Luttwak, author of classic studies of Roman and Byzantine grand strategy, argues that a state’s explicit intentions are nearly worthless in the study of grand strategy. Instead, he argues, scholars must instead glean evidence of strategy from state behavior, assuming that actions speak louder to state intentions than words. Here, I have applied this same approach to Tenochtitlan, rather than Rome or Byzantium, using a primarily Nahuatl source: the Florentine Codex. Together, a behavior-based approach and the Codex’s Nahuatl perspective pierce through the distractions of colonial Spanish observers and their analysis toreveal a clear, rational, cohesive Aztec grand strategy. The Mexica, limited by the scarce resources on the island of Tenochtitlan, took advantage of their central position to become a thriving trade economy, which they protected with close regulation and formidable military might. Using trade as a carrot and a formidable centralized military as a stick, they forged a coalition of city-states in the Basin of Mexico and projected power beyond the Basin, generating still greater revenues. However, the Aztecs sacrificed territorial control and soft power ties to the imperial center, leaving local governments, militaries, and cultures intact. Throughout the Aztec expansion, the overwhelming numbers and destructive potential of their military generated a sufficient psychological threat to prevent revolt. But Spanish weapons and diseases posed a unique threat to Mexican hegemony, undermining their legitimacy and provoking widespread revolt. The Aztecs were not easily toppled fools, but careful grand strategists, undone only by threats they could not have foreseen.