UC San Diego

My dissertation has three main parts. In the first I develop a commitment model of moral judgment. I argue that moral judgments and the broader discourse in which they take place can be understood in terms of the operation of distinct but interacting commitment strategies. To a first approximation, these strategies operate at the levels of individual and social psychology, and biological and/or cultural evolution. All commitment strategies provide motivational stability by reducing one's (perceived) flexibility of action. Some such strategies are undertaken deliberately, such as when an addict signs a contract forcing her to donate money to a despised organization if she is caught using. However, the commitment strategies associated with moral judgments are rarely if ever conscious or deliberate. In fact, a central aspect of my thesis is that the peculiar motivational power of moral judgments is importantly connected to their power to deflect attention away from our actual motivations and values, and that this motivational strategy is undermined by an awareness of its workings