UC Irvine

Plato’s Meno opens with the fundamental question, ‘can one be taught to be virtuous’? Iargue that the dialogue demonstrates that there are two distinct cognitive states commonly referred to as ‘arete’ (virtue) and guide one to perform the right actions. One cognitive state called ‘arete’ is genuine virtue; it is a form of ethical expertise and it can be taught. The other cognitive state referred to in this way is a sort of pseudo-virtue; it is a knack for doing the right thing. Although Socrates and his interlocutors agree that there are no living ethical experts, in the final lines of the Meno, Socrates imagines a statesman with this expertise who could successfully teach virtue to statesmen of the next generation. I argue that in the Republic, Plato takes up this project and creates a polis, for which the primary aim is to create a succession of statesmen with ethical expertise. My first chapters outlines the epistemology of expertise. Plato’s Meno draws a contrast between two epistemic states: episteme and doxa. Although the two epistemic states guide their possessors equally well, episteme is more valuable than correct doxa. Typically, scholars interpret this puzzle about the relative value of the epistemic states—sometimes called The Meno Problem—in the following way: why is propositional knowledge more valuable than propositional true belief?. I argue that part of the intractability of the puzzle stems from the fact that, in the Meno, ‘episteme’ does not refer to propositional knowledge. Over thepast few decades, many ancient philosophers have voiced their discomfort with interpreting episteme as propositional knowledge in the Meno. My contribution is that, in the Meno, episteme is expertise, while doxa refers to a wide-spectrum of epistemic states ranging from propositional beliefs to knacks that produce equivalent results to expertise. I marshal textual evidence from the Meno to demonstrate that episteme refers to expertise, as opposed to some less demanding epistemic state. Episteme is more valuable than the corresponding correct doxa because of its stability (Meno 98a). I argue that episteme is stable in two senses. First, it is stable within the individual. Second, it is intergenerationally stable because it can be taught. Although correct doxa can be transmitted from one individual to another, but only episteme can be taught taught. For Plato, teaching is a technical term that refers to a specific type of transmission and is synonymous with recollection. Through this process, episteme can be losslessly transmitted between one generation and the next. I then demonstrate that, in the Meno, genuine virtue is a type of expertise. I employ the epistemology, described in the first chapter, to explain the implications: if virtue is a sort of expertise, it is teachable. I argue that Plato believed virtue was teachable, genuine virtue expertise was only possible under the correct sort of constitution. This constitution is the constitution of the Kallipolis described in the Republic. In my third chapter, I articulate a novel explanation of the censorship program described in Republic 2 and 3. I argue that the censorship program is necessary for ensuring that the teaching of virtue is possible. Ethical expertise requires an extremely long education (the philosopher-kings continued their education until they turn 50). In order to prepare the soul for this, they must minimize the guardians’ exposure to anything that might shape their souls in the wrong way. Preparation begins even before their rational faculties have fully developed. The Kallipolis brings to fruition the desires Socrates expresses in the Meno for a society where a statesman could create another statesman.