UC San Diego

By disrupting the fiscal contract between citizens and the state, foreign aid is expected to be harmful to democratic development and accountability. However, the implementation of foreign aid can improve political outcomes at the local-level as voters attempt to obtain aid by overcoming numerous last-mile challenges. This dissertation provides a nuanced view of the political impact of foreign aid by considering its effect on candidate selection, political perceptions, and political participation in Pakistan. I argue that developing country voters exercise their agency to shift their political behavior on becoming aid recipients. Through the use of three original survey experiments conducted between 2018 and 2022, I show that voters prefer candidates who are more likely to direct aid funds toward them; voters are more likely to trust their government when it receives foreign aid support; and voters are more likely to demand that their local representatives facilitate access to foreign aid benefits. These results suggest that a comprehensive study of the political economy of foreign aid should consider developing country voters as political actors and not merely passive beneficiaries of foreign aid. Finally, a local-level examination of how foreign aid is disbursed can further an understanding of local politicians as aid facilitators and voters as having the ability to exercise accountability.