UCLA

The three essays in this dissertation explore how weak states can build fiscal capacity, which is essential for economic development and political stability. In Chapter 2, I argue that governments in weak states can build fiscal capacity by collaborating with non-state, traditional political institutions (TPIs). Using an experiment I embedded within the local government’s campaign to collect property taxes, I show that this collaboration increases citizens’ tax compliance becauseTPIs possess coercive capacity and legitimacy. Chapter 3 further explores the legitimacy of TPIs. I argue that traditional leaders are popular because they enforce local laws that increase community welfare. I support this argument with qualitative data from 300 interviews conducted in Kono district, Sierra Leone. Chapter 4 investigates whether governments in weak states can enhance their legitimacy and foster tax compliance by increasing public participation in political affairs. We experimentally evaluate a phone-based participatory budgeting intervention in Freetown, Sierra Leone and find that the intervention increases citizens’ perceptions of government legitimacy. Effects on tax compliance, however, are conditional on political affiliation and policy preferences about taxation.