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Joint Energy and Reserves Auction with Opportunity Cost Payment for Reserves

  • Author(s): Oren, Shmuel S.
  • Sioshansi, Ramteen
  • et al.
Abstract

System operators in the electricity industry are required to procure reserve capacity to deal with unanticipated outages, demand shocks, and transmission constraints. One traditional method of procuring reserves is through a separate capacity auction with two-part bids. We analyze an alternative scheme whereby reserves are procured through the energy market using only energy bids, and capacity payments are made based on a generator's implied opportunity cost. By using the revelation principle, we are able to derive the equilibrium bidding function in this market and show that generators have a clear incentive to understate their costs in order to capture higher capacity rents. We then give a numerical example for a special case and examine the effect of the equilibrium bidding behavior on the generators' total revenues and on the energy payments.

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