UC Santa Cruz

Philosophy has attempted to resolve questions about the meaning of language through representational and inferential semantic theories. In the work of Robert Brandom, the inferential theory is accorded explanatory priority over the representational, such that the latter can be adequately accounted for in the former’s terms. This paper argues that the representational and inferential theories should be accorded equal rank in the order of explanatory priority. Not only are assertions of explanatory priority unnecessary to account for semantic value, but explanatory strategies that reduce the imagistic quality of representation to inferential articulation do not account for important phenomena that are captured by the notion of meaning as an image. Building on the semiotics of C.S. Peirce and its reception in sociolinguistics, the paper theorizes a functional interdependency of representational and inferential aspects of meaning that explains both successful and unsuccessful linguistic and conceptual/analytical practices. The theory scaffolds a semiotic account of alienation and epistemic conflict, with resonances for both philosophy and critical theory. Finally, the theory furnishes a semiotic analysis of the phenomenon of conceptual reification that occurs even in critical analyses that seek to denaturalize their object of inquiry.