UCLA

Since 2014, the U.S. has pursuant to 18 U.S.C. � 1030 issued and publicized federal criminal indictments against nation-state cyber adversaries. Because these “bare” indictments are issued against foreign nationals from jurisdictions that are not party to a bilateral extradition treaty with the U.S., it is seen as highly unlikely that these indicted foreign nationals will ever face trial, much less be convicted. Data suggests that bare indictments may have contributed to deterrence – persuading cyber adversaries that the costs of mounting cyberattacks will outweigh the benefits – but causality has not been rigorously proven; furthermore, the reasons why bare indictments can deter cyberattacks remain unexplained. Drawing from the principles of criminal deterrence theory and its associated literature on informal sanctions, this dissertation project utilizes behavioral analysis of motive within a case study approach to demonstrate that bare indictments’ labeling the alleged cyberattacker a ‘criminal outcast’ can achieve deterrence. This project theorizes and finds that the informal sanctions triggered by the issuance and publicization of bare indictments tend to directly deny the objectives of status-seeking cyber adversaries and indirectly outweigh the aims of thrill-seeking cyber adversaries, but tend not to deter profit-seeking cyber adversaries. Moreover, the project engages with attribution theory to show that making the issuance of a bare indictment common knowledge serves as an attack on nation-state status in the international community. The case studies – spanning China, North Korea, Iran, and Russia – serve as the basis for in-depth policy recommendations. In providing suggestions for optimal leverage of bare indictments as a deterrent measure, this project argues that future threats such as cyber warfare and hybrid warfare may be countered by using domestic criminal law as an efficient means of unilateral norm formation amongst the global order.