UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs

Sport governing bodies (SGBs) such as FIFA and the International Olympic Committee absolve themselves of any liability under contract or tort from claims arising in connection with megasport events. They are able to do this by delegating all liability from potential claims to the MSE’s host state and its local organizing committee. As a result of these host state agreements, the host state will adopt enabling legislation and the SGB in question will be immune not only as a matter of contract, but also as a matter of law. This state of affairs is not satisfactory, chiefly because the SGB, as the superior negotiating party in host state agreements, has the power to impose stricter and more efficient procedures for access to justice as a form of responsibility incumbent on host states. Such responsibility may well include a rigid obligation to expeditiously and impartially subject relevant claims to standing or ad hoc judicial and arbitral bodies. In turn, these bodies must dispense justice in a manner that is consistent with fundamental human rights. This is something that SGBs have consciously failed to demand in host state agreements, thereby leaving claims by aggrieved parties unresolved or subjected to mechanisms that fail to deliver true justice. Therefore, it is imperative that the next generation of host state agreements engage with the needs of disadvantaged stakeholders and demand that host states adapt to higher standards of fair trial rights.

Thee pursuit of artificial general intelligence (AGI) poses existential risks to humanity. Global cooperation is needed to mitigate these risks. This Article proposes objectives and ideal features of a global governance regime focused on unaligned AGI and other high-risk artificial intelligence (AI). It utilizes a risk-based approach to suggest mechanisms and legal frameworks that address two objectives: safety and accountability. Along with noting ideal characteristics of a global AI safety regime, this Article evaluates precedents in existing, comparable international systems to explore possible components of and entities for global governance of high-risk AI.

The second Trump Administration has quickly abandoned longstanding American commitments to European security and to Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s invasion. Between this and an increasingly belligerent Russia, European leaders are rightly planning how to best remilitarize to defend the continent. But European rearmament faces significant exogenous and endogenous obstacles. Meanwhile, other democratic nations around the globe are similarly confronting the loss of American leadership and increasing autocratic aggression. This Comment discusses how global collective action among democracies is a more effective and durable approach than regional solutions. It first traces the promise and challenges of European rearmament, then turns to situations facing democracies in other parts of the world. The Comment concludes by offering four policy considerations to guide global democratic rearmament.