Santa Cruz Center for International Economics

This paper discusses two pertinent policy issues dealing with the global liquidity crisis - global prudential regulation reform, and reassessment of using international reserves in the crisis. We point out the paradox of prudential regulations – while the identity of economic actors that benefited directly from crises avoidance is unknown, the cost and the cumbrance of regulations are transparent. Hence, crises that had been avoided are imperceptible and are underrepresented in the political discourse, and the demand for prudential regulations declines during prolonged good times, thereby increasing the ultimate cost of eventual crises. While the seeds of the present crisis

were mostly home grown, international flows of capital magnified its costs. Global financial integration produces the by-product of “regulatory arbitrage” – capital tends to flow to underregulated countries, frequently resulting in excessive risk taking, in anticipation of future bailout. Dealing with “regulatory arbitrage” requires coordinated prudential regulations that should apply as equally as possible to domestic and foreign players. A coordinated globalized prudential regulation, by increasing the cost of prudential deregulation, would mitigate the temptation to under-regulate during prolonged good-times, thus adding a side benefit.

We also analyze the different approaches to the use of reserves during the crisis and what this means for the global financial system. The deleveraging triggered by the crisis implies that

countries that hoarded reserves have been reaping the benefits. The crisis illustrates the importance of the self insurance provided by reserves, as well as the usefulness of policies that channel a share of the windfall gains associated with improvements in the terms-of-trade to reserves and sovereign wealth funds. The reluctance of many developing countries to draw down on their reserve holdings raises the possibility that they may now suffer less from the “fear of floating” than from a “fear of losing international reserves”, which may signal deterioration in the credit worthiness of a country. While the selective swap lines offered by the FED to several EMs help, it falls short of dealing with the fear of losing reserves. Mitigating this concern should be the prime responsibility of the international financial institutions.

This paper presents a rational expectations model of asset prices with rationally inattentive investors that, unlike previous papers, can explain both the substantial amount of equity wealth invested domestically and the puzzling time series behavior of the home bias - an initial plateau before 1985, then a decrease until 1994 followed by stabilization on another plateau. When there is a financial liberalization, investors exploit past information to predict current asset payoffs. The resulting endogenous local information advantage generates a gradual decrease of the home bias until its steady state. In the long run, the home bias remains large due to the interaction of the optimal attention allocation with the optimal portfolio choice. Using measures for information capacity, informational advantages and ?financial openness as explanatory variables, we are able to explain at least 46.8% of the variation of the home bias for 19 developed countries from 1988 until 2004. Our estimates show that both variables are significant, with home bias decreasing with financial openness and increasing with information capacity, as predicted by our model.

Using a unique dataset that covers 100% of the Brazilian FX retail market, this paper contributes to the microstructure approach to exchange rates in at least four ways. First, we find a strict link between currency flows in the FX market and the Balance of Payments. Second, we develop an identication strategy in order to properly estimate the effect of customer order fl?ows on the exchange rate and ?find that dealers from the Brazilian FX market charge a premium of 0.03% in order to provide US$ 10 million of overnight liquidity. Third, we identify the nature of the feedback trading as "stabilizing"?: a 1% depreciation rate decreases the financial customer fl?ow by US$ 111 million and the commercial fl?ow by US$ 46 million. Finally, we find that the central bank sells in average US$ 28 million for each 1% depreciation in the exchange rate (lean-against-the-wind), and US$ 23 million for US$ 100 million of financial customer flow (liquidity provision).

Studies of central bank intervention are complicated by the fact that we typically observe intervention only during periods of turbulent exchange markets. Furthermore, entering the market during these particular periods is a conscious “self-selection” choice made by the intervening central bank. We estimate the “counterfactual” exchange rate movements that allow us to determine what would have occurred in the absence of intervention and we introduce the method of propensity score matching to the intervention literature in order to estimate the “average treatment effect” (ATE) of intervention. Specifically, we estimate the ATE for daily Bank of Japan intervention over the January 1999 to March 2004 period. This sample encompasses a remarkable variation in intervention frequencies as well as unprecedented frequent intervention towards the latter part of the period. We find that the effects of intervention vary dramatically and inversely with the frequency of intervention: Intervention is effective over the 1999 to 2002 period, ineffective during 2003 and counterproductive during the first quarter of 2004.

This paper studies the impact of global factors on patterns of basic research across countries and time. We rely on the records of major scientific awards, and on data dealing with global economic and historical trends. Specifically, we investigate the degree to which scale or threshold effects, and path dependency account for countries share of major prizes [Nobel, Fields, Kyoto and Wolf]. We construct a stylized model, predicting that lagged relative GDP of a country relative to the GDP of all countries engaging in basic research is an important explanatory variable of country’s share of prizes. Scale effects imply that the association between the GDP share of a country and its prize share tends to be logistic -- above a threshold, there is a “take off” range, where the prize share increases at an accelerating rate with the relative GDP share of the country, until it reaches “maturity” stage. Our empirical analyses confirm the model’s predictions, showing the non linear effects of GDP shares on prize shares, effects that are consistent with the prominence of scale effects. We validate these findings by examining the massive destructions associated with the two World Wars. With more recent data, we document the growing importance of countries that used to be at the periphery of global research, possibly advancing towards the take off stage.

Might the dollar eventually follow the precedent of the pound and cede its status as leading international reserve currency? Unlike the last time this question was prominently discussed, ten years ago, there now exists a credible competitor: the euro. This paper econometrically estimates determinants of the shares of major currencies in the reserve holdings of the world’s central banks. Significant factors include: size of the home country, inflation rate (or lagged depreciation trend), exchange rate variability, and size of the relevant home financial center (as measured by the turnover in its foreign exchange market). We have not found that net international debt position is an important determinant. Network externality theories would predict a tipping phenomenon. Indeed we find that the relationship between currency shares and their determinants is nonlinear (which we try to capture with a logistic function, or else with a dummy “leader” variable for the largest country). But changes are felt only with a long lag (we estimate a weight on the preceding year’s currency share around 0.9). The advent of the euro interrupts the continuity of the historical data set. So we estimate parameters on pre-1999 data, and then use them to forecast the EMU era. The equation correctly predicts a (small) narrowing in the gap between the dollar and euro over the period 1999-2004. Whether the euro might in the future rival or surpass the dollar as the world’s leading international reserve currency appears to depend on two things: (1) do enough other EU members join euroland so that it becomes larger than the US economy, and (2) does US macroeconomic policy eventually undermine confidence in the value of the dollar, in the form of inflation and depreciation. What we learn about functional form and parameter values helps us forecast, contingent on these two developments, how quickly the euro might rise to challenge the dollar. Under two important scenarios – the remaining EU members, including the UK, join EMU by 2020 or else the recent depreciation trend of the dollar persists into the future – the euro may surpass the dollar as leading international reserve currency by 2022.

This paper tests the importance of precautionary and mercantilist motives in accounting for the hoarding of international reserves by developing countries, and provides a model that quantifies the welfare gains from optimal management of international reserves. While the variables associated with the mercantilist motive are statistically significant, their economic importance in accounting for reserve hoarding is close to zero and is dwarfed by other variables. Overall, the empirical results are in line with the precautionary demand. The effects of financial crises have been localized, increasing reserve hoarding in the aftermath of crises mostly in countries located in the affected region, but not in other regions. We also investigate the micro foundation of precautionary demand, extending Diamond and Dybvig (1983)’s model to an open, emerging market economy where banks finance long-term projects with short-term deposits. We identify circumstances that lead to large precautionary demand for international reserves, providing self-insurance against the adverse output effects of sudden stop and capital flight shocks. This would be the case if premature liquidation of long-term projects is costly, and the economy is de-facto integrated with the global financial system, hence sudden stops and capital flight may reduce deposits sharply. We show that the welfare gain from the optimal management of international reserves is of a first-order magnitude, reducing the welfare cost of liquidity shocks from a first-order to a second-order magnitude.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the intertemporal linkages between FDI and disaggregated measures of international trade. We outline a model exemplifying some of these linkages, describe several methods for investigating two-way feedbacks between various categories of trade, and apply them to the recent experience of developing countries. After controlling for other macroeconomic and institutional effects, we find that the strongest feedback between the sub-accounts is between FDI and manufacturing trade. More precisely, applying Geweke (1982)’s decomposition method, we find that most of the linear feedback between trade and FDI (81%) can be accounted for by Granger-causality from FDI gross flows to trade openness (50%) and from trade to FDI (31%). The rest of the total linear feedback is attributable to simultaneous correlation between the two annual series.

In this paper I discuss six special features of China's trade and direct investment. These characteristics include an extensive role played by foreign-invested firms, a large percentage of re-exports and processed exports, a geographical concentration of trade and investment, a growing importance of high-technology trade and wholly foreign-owned enterprises being the dominant mode of investment.

As a developing economy, China is unusual in playing two important roles for the United States and for Asia-Pacific economies in general. It is a competitive, low-cost export platform. At the same time, it is a large and growing market. Japanese and U.S. affiliates located in China typically sell about half or more of their products produced in China in the domestic Chinese market.

U.S. government data show that U.S. affiliates in China are becoming more and more profitable. China has also become an important link in the global supply chain. There is a thick and growing production network among China and other East and Southeast Asian economies. Because of such a network, foreign direct investment flows to China tend to be positively related to foreign direct investment flows to other Asian economies.

In the post-colonial world, the countries of South Asia have evolved politically in different ways, amidst internal and regional conflicts, but retained some commonality of institutions and cultures. Since the 1990s, the promise of market-led development and the growth of a middle class, especially in India, have reshaped expectations in a way not seen since the immediate post-colonial period, and provided the prospect of a region that combines its particular approach to governance with common aspirations and achievement of economic well-being – what might be a new “idea of South Asia.” This paper examines some aspects of the development of the South Asian middle class, their role in economic development, and the potential of the idea that shared middle class aspirations of material consumption can be a regional driving force. The paper argues that, for this potential to be realized, the middle class in South Asia may need to aspire to something more than private affluence in the midst of public squalor. In that case, a new idea of South Asia will require building social capital in ways that will challenge all of the region’s societies. Effective collective action across, but first within, the nations of South Asia will be the true test of whether this potential South Asian identity emerges.