Department of Economics
Department of Economics Open Access Policy Deposits (61)
Joblessness and Lost Earnings after Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome in a 1-Year National Multicenter Study
Rationale
Following acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), joblessness is common but poorly understood.Objectives
To evaluate the timing of return to work after ARDS, and associated risk factors, lost earnings, and changes in healthcare coverage Methods: Over 12-month longitudinal follow-up, ARDS survivors from 43 U.S. ARDSNet hospitals provided employment and healthcare coverage data via structured telephone interviews. Factors associated with the timing of return to work were assessed using Fine and Gray regression analysis. Lost earnings were estimated using Bureau of Labor Statistics data.Measurements and main results
Of 922 consenting survivors, 386 (42%) were employed before ARDS (56% male; mean ± SD age, 45 ± 13 yr), with seven dying by 12-month follow-up. Of 379 previously employed 12-month survivors, 166 (44%) were jobless at 12-month follow-up. Accounting for competing risks of death and retirement, half of enrolled and previously employed survivors returned to work by 13 weeks after hospital discharge, with 68% ever returning by 12 months. Delays in return to work were associated with longer hospitalization and older age among nonwhite survivors. Over 12-month follow-up, 274 (71%) survivors accrued lost earnings, averaging $26,949 ± $22,447 (60% of pre-ARDS annual earnings). Jobless survivors experienced a 14% (95% confidence interval, 5-22%; P = 0.002) absolute decrease in private health insurance (from 44% pre-ARDS) and a 16% (95% confidence interval, 7-24%; P < 0.001) absolute increase in Medicare and Medicaid (from 33%).Conclusions
At 12 months after ARDS, nearly one-half of previously employed survivors were jobless. Post-ARDS joblessness is associated with readily identifiable patient and hospital variables and accompanied by substantial lost earnings and a shift toward government-funded healthcare coverage.An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly
We study optimal dynamic voting procedures when voting is costly. For a highly stylized specification of our model with private values, two alternatives, and binary, equally likely types we show the optimality of a voting procedure that combines two main elements: (i) there is an arbitrarily chosen default decision and abstention is interpreted as a vote in favor of the default; (ii) voting is sequential and is terminated when a supermajority requirement, which declines over time, is met. We show the optimality of such a voting procedure by arguing that it is first best, that is, it maximizes welfare when equilibrium constraints are ignored, and by showing that individual incentives and social welfare are sufficiently aligned to make a first best procedure incentive compatible. We also provide counterexamples where no first best procedure is incentive compatible when voters' binary types are not equally likely.