PBLJ is the second oldest law journal at UCLA and focuses on a diverse range of legal and policy issues in the Pacific Rim, looking to both the Asia-Pacific and the Americas. In the past, PBLJ has featured articles on topics as varied as intellectual property regimes, climate change and migration in the Pacific, corporate governance, and affordable housing policy in China.
Volume 32, Issue 1, 2014
Corruption in the Procurement of Pharmaceuticals and Medical Equipment in China: The Incentives Facing Multinationals, Domestic Firms and Hospital Officials
Calls for reform of the Chinese healthcare system are voiced at the highest levels of the Chinese government, but reform cannot succeed unless policymakers confront the incentives for corruption built into the institutional structure of the healthcare system. Focusing on the markets for pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, this article isolates the special features of the Chinese healthcare system that are conducive to corruption. Without denying the responsibility of individual corporate representatives (both domestic and foreign), middlemen, and healthcare professionals, this article looks beyond the individual deals to document the underlying incentives for corruption by hospitals, physicians, and companies and explains how corrupt practices are currently organized. Finally, we argue that curbing the prevalent corruption requires efforts from both private companies and from the government.
The Latest Developments in the Judicial Practices of Special Departments of Medical Malpractice Litigation in Japanese Courts
Plead Guilty, Without Bargaining: Learning from China’s “Summary Procedure” before Enacting Indonesia’s “Special Procedure” in Criminal Procedure
Because Indonesian courts are increasingly overrun with criminal cases, Indonesian lawmakers recently introduced a criminal procedure bill to include “special procedure” (jalur khusus), a procedure that allows defendants to plead guilty in order to increase efficiency. Unlike plea-bargaining in the United States, this procedure resembles China’s “summary procedure,” which is solely conducted by a judge, not negotiated independently by prosecutors and defendants. Before enacting the provision of special procedure, however, Indonesian lawmakers should learn from China’s successes and failures implementing summary procedure. While this procedure resulted in increased efficiency in China, it did not provide for defense counsel, and it resulted in an increased risk of false confessions. The author begins by describing the overcrowding of Indonesian courts and the need for increased efficiency. Next he describes several lessons from China’s experience by identifying China’s successes and failures after enacting summary procedure. Finally he gives specific recommendations to Indonesian lawmakers for maximizing the special procedure in light of China’s experience.