How do we stop ourselves during ongoing action? Recent work implies that stopping per se is easy given sufficient monitoring of contextual cues signaling the need to change action. We test key implications of this idea for improving inhibitory control. Seven- to 9-year-old children practiced stopping an ongoing action or monitoring for cues that signaled the need to go again. Both groups subsequently showed better response inhibition in a Stop-Signal task than active controls, and practice monitoring yielded a dose-response relationship. When monitoring practice was optimized to occur while children engaged in responding, the greatest benefits were observed-even greater than from practicing stopping itself. These findings demonstrate the importance of monitoring processes in developing response inhibition and suggest promising new directions for interventions.

Good executive function has been linked to many positive outcomes in academic performance, health, and social competence. However, some aspects of executive function may interfere with other cognitive processes. Childhood provides a unique test case for investigating such cognitive trade-offs, given the dramatic failures and developments observed during this period. For example, most children categorically switch or perseverate when asked to switch between rules on a card-sorting task. To test potential trade-offs with the development of task switching abilities, we compared 6-year-olds who switched versus perseverated in a card-sorting task on two aspects of inhibitory control: response inhibition (via a stop signal task) and interference control (via a Simon task). Across two studies, switchers showed worse response inhibition than perseverators, consistent with the idea of cognitive trade-offs; however, switchers showed better interference control than perseverators, consistent with prior work documenting benefits associated with the development of executive function. This pattern of positive and negative associations may reflect aspects of working memory (active maintenance of current goals, and clearing of prior goals) that help children focus on a single task goal but hurt in situations with conflicting goals. Implications for understanding components of executive function and their relationships across development are discussed.

The contents of working memory must be maintained in the face of distraction, but updated when appropriate. To manage these competing demands of stability and flexibility, maintained representations in working memory are complemented by distinct gating mechanisms that selectively transmit information into and out of memory stores. The operations of such dopamine-dependent gating systems in the midbrain and striatum and their complementary dopamine-dependent memory maintenance operations in the cortex may therefore be dissociable. If true, selective increases in cortical dopamine tone should preferentially enhance maintenance over gating mechanisms. To test this hypothesis, tolcapone, a catechol-O-methyltransferase inhibitor that preferentially increases cortical dopamine tone, was administered in a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled, within-subject fashion to 49 participants who completed a hierarchical working memory task that varied maintenance and gating demands. Tolcapone improved performance in a condition with higher maintenance requirements and reduced gating demands, reflected in a reduction in the slope of RTs across the distribution. Resting-state fMRI data demonstrated that the degree to which tolcapone improved performance in individual participants correlated with increased connectivity between a region important for stimulus response mappings (left dorsal premotor cortex) and cortical areas implicated in visual working memory, including the intraparietal sulcus and fusiform gyrus. Together, these results provide evidence that augmenting cortical dopamine tone preferentially improves working memory maintenance.

The inhibition of unwanted behaviors is considered an effortful and controlled ability. However, inhibition also requires the detection of contexts indicating that old behaviors may be inappropriate--in other words, inhibition requires the ability to monitor context in the service of goals, which we refer to as context-monitoring. Using behavioral, neuroimaging, electrophysiological and computational approaches, we tested whether motoric stopping per se is the cognitively-controlled process supporting response inhibition, or whether context-monitoring may fill this role. Our results demonstrate that inhibition does not require control mechanisms beyond those involved in context-monitoring, and that such control mechanisms are the same regardless of stopping demands. These results challenge dominant accounts of inhibitory control, which posit that motoric stopping is the cognitively-controlled process of response inhibition, and clarify emerging debates on the frontal substrates of response inhibition by replacing the centrality of controlled mechanisms for motoric stopping with context-monitoring.