We revisit Hausman and Joskow (1982)'s economic rationales for appliance minimum energy efficiency standards. In addition to the four market failures they argued could justify appliance standards--energy prices below marginal social cost, consumers underestimating energy prices, consumer discount rates above social discount rates, or principal agent problems--we discuss two additional market failures that are relevant and potentially economically important in this context: market power and innovation market failures. We highlight puzzles uncovered by recent empirical results, and suggest directions future research should take to better understand the normative implications of appliance standards.

We identify a novel contextual variable that alters the evaluation of delayed rewards in healthy participants and those diagnosed with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). When intertemporal choices are constructed of monetary outcomes with rounded values (e.g., $25.00), discount rates are greater than when the rewards have nonzero decimal values (e.g., $25.12). This finding is well explained within a dual system framework for temporal discounting in which preferences are constructed from separate affective and deliberative processes. Specifically, we find that round dollar values produce greater positive affect than do nonzero decimal values. This suggests that relative involvement of affective processes may underlie our observed difference in intertemporal preferences. Furthermore, we demonstrate that intertemporal choices with rounded values recruit greater brain responses in the nucleus accumbens to a degree that correlates with the size of the behavioral effect across participants. Our demonstration that a simple contextual manipulation can alter self-control in ADHD has implications for treatment of individuals with disorders of impulsivity. Overall, the decimal effect highlights mechanisms by which the properties of a reward bias perceived value and consequent preferences.