Like scientists, children must find ways to explain causal
systems in the world. The Bayesian approach to cognitive
development holds that children evaluate explanations by
applying a normative set of statistical learning and
hypothesis-testing mechanisms to the evidence they
observe. Here, we argue for certain supplements to this
approach. In particular, we demonstrate in two studies that
children, like adults, have a robust latent scope bias that
conflicts with the laws of probability. When faced with two
explanations equally consistent with observed data, where
one explanation made an unverified prediction, children
consistently preferred the explanation that did not make
this prediction (Experiment 1). The bias can be overridden
by strong prior odds, indicating that children can integrate
cues from multiple sources of evidence (Experiment 2). We
argue that children, like adults, rely on heuristics for
making explanatory judgments which often lead to
normative responses, but can lead to systematic error.