Designing accurate and high-fidelity broadband pulses is an essential component in conducting quantum experiments across fields from protein spectroscopy to quantum optics. However, constructing exact and analytic broadband pulses remains unsolved due to the nonlinearity and complexity of the underlying spin system dynamics. Here, we present a nontrivial dynamic connection between nonlinear spin and linear spring systems and show the surprising result that such nonlinear and complex pulse design problems are equivalent to designing controls to steer linear harmonic oscillators under optimal forcing. We derive analytic broadband π/2 and π pulses that perform exact, or asymptotically exact, excitation and inversion over a defined bandwidth, and also with bounded amplitude. This development opens up avenues for pulse sequence design and lays a foundation for understanding the control of two-level systems.Coherent control of two-level systems is crucial for achieving fidelity in spectroscopy and quantum computing, but inherent nonlinearities and parameter variation have, to date, required an approximate, numerical approach. Here, Li et al. show how to map a spin ensemble to a spring model so analytic pulses can be designed using linear methods.

In the past decade we have seen an active research community proposing attacks and defenses to Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). Most of these attacks and defenses have been heuristic in nature, limiting the attacker to a set of predefined operations, and proposing defenses with unclear security guarantees. In this paper, we propose a generic adversary model that can capture any type of attack (our attacker is not constrained to follow specific attacks such as replay, delay, or bias) and use it to design security mechanisms with provable security guarantees. In particular, we propose a new secure design paradigm we call DARIA: Designing Actuators to Resist arbItrary Attacks. The main idea behind DARIA is the design of physical limits to actuators in order to prevent attackers from arbitrarily manipulating the system, irrespective of their point of attack (sensors or actuators) or the specific attack algorithm (bias, replay, delays, etc.). As far as we are aware, we are the first research team to propose the design of physical limits to actuators in a control loop in order to keep the system secure against attacks. We demonstrate the generality of our proposal on simulations of vehicular platooning and industrial processes.