Are smaller members of the World Trade Organization able to use the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism on an equal footing with the more powerful members of the organization? This paper examines the relationship between the wealth and power of states and their ability to participate fully within this system of dispute resolution. Two alternative hypotheses are considered. The “power hypothesis” predicts that politically weak countries will refrain from filing complaints against politically powerful states for fear of costly retaliation. The “capacity hypothesis” predicts the opposite – low income states will tend to complain about behavior by high income states because the latter offer a higher expected return.

Using the set of all WTO disputes we test these two hypotheses and find considerable support for the capacity hypothesis and no support for the power hypothesis. We conclude that poor states behave differently than their rich counterparts because they lack the financial, human, and institutional capital to participate fully in the dispute resolution system.

Are smaller members of the World Trade Organization able to use the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism on an equal footing with the more powerful members of the organization? This paper examines the relationship between wealth and power of states and their ability to participate fully within this system of dispute resolution. Two alternative hypotheses are considered. The "power hypothesis" predicts that politically weak countries will refrain from filing complaints against politically powerful states for fear of costly retaliation. The "capacity hypothesis" predicts the opposite - low income states will tend to complain about behavior by high income states because the latter offer a higher expected return.

Using the set of all WTO disputes we test these two hypotheses and find considerable support for the capacity hypothesis and no support for the power hypothesis. We conclude that poor states behave differently than their rich counterparts because they lack the financial, human, and institutional capital to participate fully in the dipute resolution system.

Over the past forty-five years, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become the most important international legal mechanism for the encouragement and governance of foreign direct investment. Their proliferation over the past two decades in particular has been phenomenal. These intergovernmental treaties typically grant extensive rights to foreign investors, including protection of contractual rights and the right to international arbitration in the event of an investment dispute. How can we explain the diffusion of BITs? We argue that the spread of BITs is driven by international competition among potential host countries - typically developing countries - for foreign direct investment. We design and test three different measures of economic competition. We also look for indirect evidence of competitive pressures on the host to sign BITs. The evidence suggests that potential hosts are more likely to sign BITs when their competitors have done so. We find some evidence that coercion plays a role, but less support for learning or cultural explanations. Our main finding is that diffusion in this case is associated with competitive economic pressures among developing countries to capture a share of foreign investment. We are agnostic at this point about the benefits of this competition for development.

Over the past forty-five years, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become the most important international legal mechanism for the encouragement and governance of foreign direct investment. Their proliferation over the past two decades in particular has been phenomenal. These intergovernmental treaties typically grant extensive rights to foreign investors, including protection of contractual rights and the right to international arbitration in the event of an investment dispute. How can we explain the diffusion of BITs? We argue that the spread of BITs is driven by international competition among potential host countries - typically developing countries - for foreign direct investment. We design and test three different measures of economic competition. We also look for indirect evidence of competitive pressures on the host to sign BITs. The evidence suggests that potential hosts are more likely to sign BITs when their competitors have done so. We find some evidence that coercion plays a role, but less support for learning or cultural explanations. Our main finding is that diffusion in this case is associated with competitive economc pressures among developing countires to capture a share of foreign investment. We are agnostic at this point about the benefits of this competiton for development.

Over the past forty- five years, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become the most important international legal mechanism for the encouragement and governance of foreign direct investment. Their proliferation over the past two decades in particular has been phenomenal. These intergovernmental treaties typically grant extensive rights to foreign investors, including protection of contractual rights and the right to international arbitration in the event of an investment dispute. We argue that the spread of BITs is driven by international competition among potential host countries – typically developing countries – for foreign direct investment. We design and test three different measures of competition. The evidence suggests that potential hosts are more likely to sign BITs when their competitors have done so. We also control for diffusion via coercion, social learning, and cultural networks. We find some evidence that coercion plays a role, but less support for learning or cultural explanations. Our main finding is that diffusion in this case is associated with competitive economic pressures among developing countries to capture a share of foreign investment. We are agnostic at this point about the benefits of this competition for development.