Institute of European Studies

In the late 1990s, the European Left seemed to be once more in the ascendancy with Social Democratic-led governments in power in the majority of EU countries, including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. At the same time, the debate about the so-called ‘Third Way’ — as an icon of the apparent electoral revitalization of European Social Democracy — rose to become the most important reform discourse in the European party landscape.

In Germany, the much heralded ‘Neue Mitte’ reform agenda of Gerhard Schroeder’s incoming new cabinet of 1998 owed obvious intellectual debt to the Blairite doctrine of the Third Way. Against this background, some observers claim to have identified a convergent trend within European Social Democracy, while others stress the importance of national contexts and point to distinct national profiles ranging from market-oriented New Labour to (what used to be) statist ‘Jospinism’. In this context, this paper seeks to set the policy agenda of Germany’s Red-Green government into a comparative European perspective.

The paper examines institutional changes in the political and administrative structures governing the cities of Berlin, London and Paris. In doing so, it analyzes the extent to which convergent trends – driven by forces related to increased international competition and European integration – have shaped recent reforms of the governance systems of these European capital cities.

In particular, the analysis focuses on the vertical dimension of centralization vs. decentralization as reflected in the power balance between city-wide authorities and lower-tiers of government (such as Bezirke, boroughs or arrondissements). In view of the two-tier system of government, there are many clear lines of comparison between the sample cities. Traditionally, however, in each case government reform has followed conspicuously different routes. While Paris represents a classical example of a centralized-unitary city government, London’s system of government – despite the recently installed Greater London Authority – illustrates vividly a pluralistic and borough-centered approach. On the spectrum between these polar ends, Berlin’s variant of urban governance appears to take a middle position featuring both a well-established city-wide government and a relatively autonomous – and recently strengthened – level of district authorities.

The sample cities also capture and encapsulate three distinct national and urban administrative cultures which are expected to be significant factors in shaping institutional developments by defining a corridor of path-dependent reform trajectories.

There is, in theory, a plausible role for the European Union as the partner of a militarily assertive United States: the peacekeeper that follows in the wake of the peacemaker. The war in Iraq, however, has raised the possibility of a diametrically different role for Europe: as a potential imperial rival to the United States. There is no need to invoke the memory of either Rome or Byzantium to make the case that Europe is capable of spoiling America’s unipolar party. The successful conclusion of accession agreements with ten new member countries – not to mention the sustained appreciation of the euro against the dollar since Kennedy’s article appeared – have seemingly vindicated this analysis. So too, in the eyes of some commentators, has the vociferous and not wholly ineffectual opposition of at least some E.U. member states to American policy in Iraq. If the U.S. has an imperial rival today, then the E.U. appears to be it.

This paper compares approaches towards food safety regulation in Europe and the United States. It focuses on mad cow disease and examines how the British Government and the European Union handled the first big crisis in the nineties, juxtaposed to the American response. This worst public health disaster in Europe has led to new agencies and policies. However, these institutional changes do not abolish fragmentation, but extend the existing landscape of regulatory bodies. The paper emphasizes that fragmentation – as the American case shows despite its shortcomings – prevents science from being captured by the state, allows interest groups broader access and ensures a distinct pattern of checks and balances.