UCLA Center for European and Eurasian Studies

Closer co-operation is possible in two variants, the quasi official "enhanced co-operation" INSIDE the EU treaty and institutions, and the one OUTSIDE the EU and according to treaties established under international law. Their feasibility, utility, and compatibility with basic principles of European integration are examined, and both variants are found to need improvement as to feasibility and to modus operandi.

Such improvements are shown to conflict with compatibility, especially in the case of enhanced co-operation. The Constitutional treaty is a useful indicator for the manner in which this dilemma could be solved: Closer co-operation outside the treaty would be conceded a more legitimate role as an instrument of member states wanting to deepen integration among themselves.

The main objective of this paper is to study the impact of globalisation on migratory flows, with a particular attention to the dynamics of migration from the MENA area, especially Egypt. The theoretical aim of the paper is, first, to understand the problem of migration, both legal and illegal, in the context of globalisation; and, second, to assess the relation between globalisation, regionalisation and the EU response to threats of mass immigration from less developed countries. The empirical analysis is based on the results of a survey (110 questionnaires) carried out by the author in Cairo on motivations for migration at the point of origin. The paper argues that the case of Egypt is one in which the lack of regionalisation and the progressive marginalisation of the region and, in particular, of the country under analysis, do explain the increase in permanent migration to more developed countries.

French chanson is rightly renowned for finding fitting words and melodies to sing the essential feelings of human life.

„Non je ne regrette rien“, sang Edith Piaf: No, I regret nothing!, and this might be a leitmotif of Non-voters in France when they think of the 29th may 2005 when they succeeded in gaining a majority of 54% and blocking the ratification of the European Constitution, for France, and-–together with the Netherlands–-for the rest of the European Union. The days after, 54% of interviewed Frenchmen confirmed this non, je ne regrette rien, considering themselves satisfied with the NON decision, and ony 39% were dissatisfied. (Eurobarometer 6/2005, par 3.1)

But it is also true that many of them may now already have started to ask themselves, in the words of another icon of French chanson, Gilbert Becaud : „Et maintenant, que vais je faire ?“, And now, what shall I do?

This question is not only asked by them, the parties and other political movements which battled for the Non, it is also asked by political leaders who had defended the Oui / Yes, and who find themselves, as in the Socialist Party, with a majority of members who voted Non, or in the government, which had from its top downwards, defended the Yes, and which now faces an electorate which disavowed it resoundingly, and which expects its opposing vote to be heard and to find expression in politics.

But „Que vais je faire?“, this question is also asked beyond the borders of France, in other European capitals and political movements, and in Brussels, the EU's capital. And naturally, the European Union's friends all over the world, also in the United States, are asking what the significance is, of this NON, and what France and what Europe, will do in the months after this disavowal of official French European policy, by its own people. And opinions vary widely.

The author uses the term “constructing victimhood” to characterize this specific relation, an expression that might sound awkward in the context of Nazi victimization since terms like ‘construction’ or ‘production,’ when used to describe social, cultural and political phenomena, tend to convey the notion that something is invented or even fabricated, therefore not a given reality. It is of course not my intention to leave this impression since there is no doubt about the true nature of Nazi persecution. But instead, she uses the term in an attempt at capturing developments and phenomena of the immediate post-war era that testify to grappling with the extraordinary character of Nazi crimes.

In this paper we will discuss the following question: can the international movement of Berbers be considered a Diaspora? We will first look at the meaning of the concept Diaspora, then at the history, geographical dispersion of Berbers and the current political context in Morocco. After that we discuss some results of a study on new trends among Moroccan associations in the Netherlands and on the Berber associations (Kraal & van Heelsum, 2002). The outcomes show that the number of associations that publicly bare the designation Berber and that are engaged mainly in Berber issues is evidently on the increase in the Netherlands. But identity issues seem to be more important to the members than political ones. We will subsequently describe the activities of the Berber associations throughout Europe and their transnational ties. In conclusion we will examine weather the concept of Diaspora fits to the situation of the Berbers.

Since the attacks on New York and Washington DC in 2001, the US public has become actively engaged in what the White House has coined a 'war on terrorism.' While the adversaries are becoming increasingly clear to the larger public, regional experts have known for years that significant threats have been cultivated from countries like Saudi Arabia which has used religious intolerance and endless supplies of petrol dollars to indoctrinate impoverished and vulnerable populations throughout the world. Indeed, the identification of the Taliban in late 2001 as a central threat to US security has been looked upon by specialists with a sense of irony. After all, it was Saudi Arabia that was the primary source of both financial and ideological support for the Taliban movement. This paper studies another case of aggressive Saudi indoctrination. The war-torn region of Kosova has, since the end of war in mid-1999, been flooded by organizations linked to the same educational and humanitarian agencies that helped turn a portion of the Afghan refugee community in the 1980s into a factionalized and highly antagonistic population. There is a tragic irony in Western governments neglecting the rural poor in Kosova, ostensibly leaving this population at the mercy of Islamic organizations bent on homogenizing a traditionally tolerant and diverse community. In the past, other attempts to impose theological rigidities on society failed, cases that this paper highlights to emphasize that it is not inevitable that a segment of the Kosovar Albanian population become linked to Saudi Wahhabi doctrine. That said, as Western aid agencies and governments have neglected the communities most destroyed by war and thus most in need of assistance, the monopolization of that aid by Saudi organizations may result in exactly what post September 11th policy-makers want to avoid.