UC Irvine

This dissertation resolves the frame problem of reason for enactivist philosophy through the implementation of the hinge epistemology of Danièle Moyal-Sharrock. Chapter 1 of the dissertation outlines the frame problem as presented and discussed by Daniel Dennett and introduces its tensions for epistemologists and enactivists more specifically. Chapter 2 of the dissertation provides an exploration of enactivist approaches toward framing higher-order cognition using the three examples outlined previously and finds that the framing of higher-order forms of thought informed by language remain out of reach of the explanatory power of enactivism. Chapter 3 demonstrates the importance of language in constituting and shaping our cognition and subsequently outlines key enactivist conceptions of language. The final chapter of the dissertation provides a conclusive argument for the adoption of Danièle Moyal-Sharrock’s hinge epistemology as a way to resolve the frame problem of reasoning for enactivism. The general applicability of Wittgensteinian hinges on the frame problem will be taken up and the hinge epistemologies of Annalisa Coliva, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, and Duncan Pritchard will be subsequently examined. Our exploration of these views will show that Moyal-Sharrock’s account is perfectly suited to resolve the frame problem through the enacted certainty of hinge epistemology while remaining faithful to the 4E commitments motivating this project.