UC Riverside

This document includes four essays on dynamic games and information. This abstract briefly overviews the main content. Each chapter has its own abstract on the first page of each chapter. The first chapter discusses the difficulty of controlling advertisers if consumers' attention is limited and if advertisers freely send multiple messages to consumers. We utilize a novel advantage of evolutionary implementation to show the difficulty; Evolutionary implementation, in its process, can reveal extensive information about externalities.

The following chapters discuss the difference between perfect and sequential equilibria. The difference has been known to be tiny. However, we need several new concepts to understand the exact difference. For example, we propose a well-mixed strategy profile the expected payoffs of each choice at each information set are identical to the ones of a completely mixed strategy profile. A well-mixed strategy profile does not have to give each choice a positive probability. Therefore, this new concept expands the application range of many other solution concepts based on a completely mixed strategy profile.