UC Irvine

Chapter 1 investigates what we are asking when we ask about meaning in life. I begin via conceptual-linguistic analysis to arrive at a pretheoretical account informed by survey results and common intuitions. I precisify the account to avoid overlap with other concepts like happiness, pleasure, and moral praiseworthiness. The result is close to Susan Wolf’s account. I give a detailed summary of her account that stresses our agreement concerning (1) methodology, (2) the importance of both a subjective and objective condition, and (3) the motivational force of meaning. I end the summary with an objection: Wolf is merely describing a hybrid good rather than giving a full account of meaning. I then make the case for my claim that meaning is not merely another good to add to the list of things that make a life go well, but instead a matter of how the goods in a life are organized. When we ask about meaning in life, we are asking about how the goods of a life are related to one another, and I defend what I call robust narrative meaning in life: a view that builds on Helena de Bres’s influential narrative account. My account foregrounds narrative as a means of explaining the importance of significance, purpose, and intelligibility in our explanation concerning the content and import of meaning in life.

Chapter 2 asks how it is possible for a group to lead a meaningful life, as a group. I begin with a quick recounting of the meaning of “meaning” in more general terms than what was seen in Chapter 1. The goal is to take a bigger picture view of meaning that remains neutral on some of the more controversial claims from Chapter 1. Instead, my focus is on the coherence of group meaning. I give accounts of “social group” and “group life” before proceeding to make the case for the viability of social groups bearing the property of meaning in life. I consider and reject summativism about group meaning before defending the joint commitment account of the meaning of a group’s life.

Chapter 3 investigates the possibility and implications of group immortality. I consider two widely-cited objections to individual immortality – namely, excessive boredom and very bad events – and argue that neither objection applies in the case of immortal (or very-long lasting) group lives. I end by unpacking an important upshot: individual participation in (good) immortal groups is an underexplored way to add meaning to an individual’s life.