Is It Good to be Good? Individuals’ Judgments about the Congruence between Moral Actions and Self-Interest
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Is It Good to be Good? Individuals’ Judgments about the Congruence between Moral Actions and Self-Interest

Abstract

What is morally right or wrong is independent of self-interest: one does not need to consult their self-interest to tell right from wrong. Acts motivated by self-interested reasons do not have a strictly moral character. However, from little inconveniences to considerable personal cost and large sacrifice, moral actions often have direct impact on the agent’s self-interest. Thus, it can be asked, “Is acting morally good for oneself?”, “Are moral actions congruent with the agent’s self-interest?” This study examined children’s and adults’ general judgments about the relations between moral actions and self-interest, as well as their concrete judgments about how moral actions are related to the agent’s own good or interest in hypothetical contextualized situations. One hundred and eleven participants from three age groups (children 11-14 years old, young adults 18-24 years old, older adults 34-67 years old) were either individually interviewed or responded to an online survey (which has the same structure and questions as the interview) about general questions regarding the relation between moral action and self-interest, and contextualized hypothetical situations describing a protagonist who faces a conflict between a moral choice and self-interest. The hypothetical situations consisted of two positively valenced (Helping and Intervention) and two negatively valanced situations (Stealing and Bribing), with each situation having a low cost/gain and a high cost/gain condition. Participants made three types of evaluations about each hypothetical situation: moral decision judgment (i.e., about what the protagonist should do), moral permissibility or obligation judgment (i.e., about whether it is permissible for the protagonist to prioritize self-interest over a moral end), and moral congruence judgment (i.e., about whether acting morally is good for the protagonist him- or herself). The results indicate that the majority of participants believed acting morally aligns with self-interest (“good for oneself”), often justifying this belief by citing the emotional, psychological, and social benefits of acting morally. Children were more likely than older participants to judge moral actions as personally beneficial and as having a direct impact on their life outcomes. Judgments regarding specific hypothetical situations revealed more variation and complexity. Across all age groups, judgments of moral congruence were highly sensitive to the magnitude of personal cost or gain, irrespective of the situation’s valence. When personal stakes were substantial, the majority of participants judged the moral choice to be “not good” for the protagonist or, conversely, deemed the immoral choice “good”. Notably, participants varied in their approach to these “good-for” judgments: some offered practical or normative suggestions, while others appeared to be making simple psychological predictions. In positive situations—such as helping or intervening—judging a moral action to be “not good” for the protagonist was strongly associated with both the judgment that the agent was permitted to prioritize their personal interest and the decision that they should do so. By contrast, this pattern did not hold in negative situations, such as refraining from stealing or rejecting a bribe. In these instances, participants overwhelmingly judged that it was not permissible to act immorally for personal gain, and that the agent should not engage in these acts, even when they simultaneously judged that the immoral acts would be “good” for the agent. Together, these findings highlight the nuanced ways individuals judge the relationship between morality and self-interest, showing that these judgments function as an active framework shaping both moral judgment and the underlying motivation to act.