UC Davis

Using an explanatory sequential mixed-methods design, we analyze quantitative administrative and survey data and qualitative archival data to examine the organizational character of standardized test cheating among educators in Georgia elementary schools. Applying a theoretical typology that identifies distinct forms of rule breaking in bureaucratic organizations, we find that teacher-focused, individual-level explanations for cheating are inadequate, particularly in the context of large-scale cheating outbreaks. Our findings suggest cheating scandals tend to arise when rule-breaking decisions shift toward higher levels of the educational bureaucracy, and school and district leaders enact multiple strategies to motivate coordinated cheating efforts among lower-level educators. In these scenarios, a “bad apples” explanation focused on rogue teachers fails to account for the systematic organizational underpinnings of standardized test cheating. We describe the institutional and organizational predictors of organized adult cheating on standardized tests, and we conclude with a discussion of our findings’ implications for education policy and research.