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The Scope of Functional Neurological Disorder: Symptom Perception, Inference, and Psychiatry
- Laukaityte, Urte
- Advisor(s): Noe, Alva;
- Campbell, John
Abstract
Consider a patient presenting with a severe form of clinical impairment – perhaps they reportblindness or one of their limbs is paralysed. Now picture learning that their illness was ameliorated or even cured via psychotherapy or a placebo intervention. This would be incredibly surprising in cases in which blindness or paralysis result from structural damage or disease. However, it is very much possible in cases of functional neurological disorder (FND). This dissertation focuses on establishing the scope of FND based on the cognitive mechanisms plausibly involved in generating the condition. In particular, I argue that the phenomenon of FND is unlikely to be restricted to somatic presentations in medicine. Instead, it should likewise apply to what would ordinarily be deemed mental symptoms falling under the purview of psychiatry, manifesting as what I termed functional psychiatric symptom disorder.
My argument proceeds in several steps: the currently leading predictive processing-basedmodel implicates unconscious inference in yielding a highly trusted subpersonal expectation of a given symptom, which gets enacted. In other words, the cognitive system (self-)generates the impairment that, on some level, it already deems to be present. More generally, previous scholarship suggests that somatic symptom experience relies on such inferential processes across the board – one’s state of health or lack thereof would have to be inferred by the cognitive system. Various factors are thought to be relevant in modulating how close of a link there is between symptoms and pathology in different cases, including personality traits, personal background, sociocultural context, the sort of damage or disease involved, if any, and so on. There is thus a continuum reflecting the extent to which subjectively felt symptoms track objectivist damage or disease in line with the inferential view of symptom perception. FND lies at the extreme end of it, capturing cases with severe symptoms but little to no correspondence with underlying damage or disease.
I submit that, in light of the medical model, such a continuum is not restricted to somaticsymptoms – states of psychological ill-health are likely susceptible to similar processes, contrary to the current implicitly dualistic separation of the two. That is, if there is indeed a continuum of relevance to symptom perception, for purposes of research the scope of FND more narrowly and functional symptoms more broadly should accommodate all symptoms with little to no correspondence with underlying disease or damage unless and until the field is in a position to identify robust generalisations to separate different subtypes in a rigorous way. The project is future-oriented in that it aims to map out the conceptual space of mechanism-related possibilities, which should be taken into account, if psychiatry is to move towards the causes-oriented strong interpretation of the medical model. The possibility of functional symptoms in psychiatry thus comprises a theoretical but empirically grounded hypothesis that should be testable, once we have the right tools to do so. The proposal has implications for the concept of psychiatric disorder as well as clinical practice.