UC Davis

Critical infrastructure control systems continue to foster predictable communication paths and static configurations that allow easy access to our networked critical infrastructure around the world. This makes them attractive and easy targets for cyber-attack. We have developed technologies that address these attack vectors by automatically reconfiguring network settings. Applying these protective measures will convert control systems into «moving targets» that proactively defend themselves against attack. This «Moving Target Defense» (MTD) revolves about the movement of network reconfiguration, securely communicating reconfiguration specifications to other network nodes as required, and ensuring that connectivity between nodes is uninterrupted. Software-defined Networking (SDN) is leveraged to meet many of these goals. Our MTD approach eliminates adversaries targeting known static attributes of network devices and systems, and consists of the following three techniques: (1) Network Randomization for TCP/UDP Ports; (2) Network Randomization for IP Addresses; (3) Network Randomization for Network Paths In this paper, we describe the implementation of the aforementioned technologies. We also discuss the individual and collective successes for the techniques, challenges for deployment, constraints and assumptions, and the performance implications for each technique.