UC Riverside

When internal armed threats emerge, capable of holding territory, threatening the lives of citizens and undermining national sovereignty, every armed bureaucracy of the state becomes relevant. This includes an actor whose internal deployment has historically threatened democracy: the military. This study undertakes comparative analyses of two democracies which have defied expectation, Colombia and Mexico, to understand what civilian governments are able to do once military guns turn inward. I find that the presence of a viable alternatives to the military, which I describe with the term “alternative security forces” curbs military autonomy when this rival agent enjoys the same level of access to the commander-in-chief which the armed forces does. To understand the dynamics between civilian governments, militaries, and alternative security forces, I employ a multi-agent adaptation of the principal agent framework. I find that disputes between militaries and alternative security forces not only provide opportunities for civilians to increase their management over security policy, but also incentivize civilians to become more knowledgeable and proactive over internal security as well.